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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Hydro generation plays an important role in electricity generation, especially in 
countries like New Zealand where 60 to 65 percent of electricity is generated in 
the hydro sector. In contrast to other types of electricity generation, for example 
gas generation, hydro generation has two unique properties: uncertainty 
regarding future resource availability and the ability to store the nature resource. 
Although hydro resource is often considered to be ‘free’, the ability to store 
creates an endogenous hidden marginal cost of water: usage today entails the 
loss of the ability to be used in future periods. Therefore pricing in a hydro 
dominated electricity market should be different from the approaches applied in 
markets that consist of generation methods that use only non-storable resources. 
This paper introduces a tractable approach to model a hydro dominated 
electricity market that incorporates inter-temporal decision making. It enables us 
to compute the equilibrium outcomes and the endogenous hidden marginal cost 
of water under different market structures.  
 
There are many other works that focus on modelling the electricity market.  A 
popular approach is to compare the actual offers of individual generators with 
estimates of the operational marginal cost of turning fuel into electricity. Works 
along this line include Boreinstein, Bushnell and Wolak(2002), Wolak (2002), 
Wolfram(1998), Joskow and Kahn(2002).  Boreinstein, Bushnell and Wolak (1998), 
Wolak(2002), and Joskow and Kahn (2002) study the California wholesale 
electricity market;  whereas Wolfram (1998) investigates in British electricity spot 
market.  A problem with this approach is that the estimates of the operational 
marginal cost are computed in a static setting assuming full information.  This 
approach does not work in hydro dominated electricity markets like the New 
Zealand Electricity Market where there is uncertainty regarding fuel/water 
availability and ability to store fuel/water over time. Many real option related 
works have shown that the ability to a store nature resource creates a hidden 
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option value.  Evans and Guthrie (2009) show that uncertainty about resource 
factors may materially affect generator behaviours. However, many regulators 
still apply the operational marginal cost approach to detect the existence of 
market power in electricity markets, including the ones which are hydro-
dominated.  An observation of price exceeding the operational marginal cost 
(estimated in a static setting), without taken into account the hidden option 
value, is regarded as evidence that the generators are abusing their market 
power. Our paper also shows that under certain settings, the presence of real 
options embedded in the stored fuel make it difficult to detect abuses of market 
power in practice. 
 
There are some operations research works that use dynamic decision making 
approach to model electricity market. The most relevant works include Scott and 
Read (1996) and Hogan, Read and Ring (1996). These works simulate an 
electricity market and model electricity generators’ behaviour under a dynamic 
setting. However, most of these works are considerably complex and difficult to 
calibrate and implement. Additionally, their discrete-time model in contrast to 
our period-by-period optimization approach does not incorporate the real 
dynamic of the uncertainty in the natural resource. 
 
Another class of literature uses Bayesian Nash Equilibrium to model electricity 
prices. These models build on an equilibrium framework to explain electricity 
spot prices in terms of observable state variables and then using non-arbitrage 
condition to value derivatives.  Hortacsu and Puller (2005) and Hortacsu and 
Puller (2008) are examples of this line of research. They develop a single-period 
equilibrium model to model electricity spot prices under a oligopoly market 
structure. While these approaches are forward looking, they are difficult to 
calibrate.  Unlike our model, they do not permit study of markets where 
generators use different fuels. 
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Our model is calibrated to the New Zealand electricity market using publicly 
available data to take into account the property of hydro dominance, volatile 
inflow and low capacity of lake storage.  It is tractable enough such that it can be 
easily modified to allow calibration. In this thesis we consider two polar cases of 
market structure – a competitive market and monopoly.  The comparison 
between the two allows us to assess whether market structure is important for 
the effect of changes in properties of the nature resource.  
 
The thesis is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model. In section 3 
we present the methodology for implementing the model in a competitive 
market setting and in a monopoly market setting. In section 4 we calibrate the 
model to the New Zealand Electricity Market. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the results.  In section 6 we change a few nature related inputs of the model and 
assess how these affect market performance. We will investigate the 
performance of the commonly used market power tests in section 7. Conclusions 
will be drawn in section 8. 
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Section 2:  Model set-up  
 
There are two types of agents in our model. Producers who generate electricity 
then sell it in a spot market; and consumers who purchase electricity at the 
market determined price.  
 
The producer owns two types of electricity generation plants: a hydro plant and 
a gas plant.  One firm owning multiple types of generation plants is a common 
scenario in New Zealand. The qualities of electricity produced by both plants are 
identical, however the costs associated with the different plants are not the same.  
 
There is a limit on the amount of hydro resource that is available at each point in 
time, given by current inflows plus stored inflows. The hydro generation plant 
has the ability to store its input resources (i.e. water) over time in the storage 
lake. This allows the producer to allocate hydro energy across time.  
 
Nature generates water inflow to the storage lake ty  according to an Ito process.  
It is constructed from a drift function       , a volatility function       , and a 
Wiener Process  . It is 
                                  [1] 
 
Given the amount of water inflow, the producer decides how much of it to use 
to generate electricity immediately and how much to store in the lake to save it 
for future generation.  Let    denote the amount of water stored in the lake at 
time t. The lake level     must satisfy the condition that        , where   is the 
maximum storage capacity. In other words, the amount of water in the lake has 
to be non-negative and cannot exceed the maximum capacity. 
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In each period, the producer will choose the amount of electricity generated by 
each plant. Assuming that each unit of water/gas generates exactly one unit of 
electricity (for gas generation, this is equivalent to having a heat rate equal to 
one), we denote the amount of water used in generating electricity (which is 
equivalent to the number of units of electricity being generated using hydro 
energy) by tz , and denote the amount of gas used in generation at time t by tm .  
Both hydro generation and the gas generation have a maximum capacity 
constraint on the amount of generation that can be generated in each period, 
denoted by   and  . At any given period t, the actual generation must be less or 
equal to the capacity constraint, that is, 
      , 
                                          .                              [2] 
 
It is assumed that the lake level will not be changed by any external factors apart 
from natural inflow and electricity generation related withdrawal. Specifically, 
no water is lost through evaporation and infiltration, although it may be spilled. 
 
At each point in time, given the water inflow    and the amount of water used to 
generate electricity   , the change in lake level equals the net difference between 
inflow and outflow. That is, the lake level    evolves according to the following 
process 
                                                                                                  [3] 
 
We make the following assumptions about generation costs: 
 
- The cost of converting each unit of hydro energy into electricity is zero. 
- The total cost of converting    units of gas into electricity is         
  . 
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Once the electricity is generated, it can be transmitted to consumers at given 
transmission costs where: 
- The transmission cost for hydro generated electricity is    per unit. 
- The transmission cost for gas generated electricity is    per unit. 
 
In our model we set the transmission cost for hydro generated electricity to be 
higher than the transmission cost for gas generated electricity (that is,        ). 
This is designed to reflect the fact that in general hydro generation plants are 
situated  further away from the high demand location than are the gas 
generation plants, due to the geographical location of fuel and cost of fuel 
transmission. 
 
Given the total electricity generation         supplied by the producer, the 
market will determine the market clearing price for each unit of electricity 
according to a linear inverse demand function, 
 
                                                             .                    [4] 
 
This inverse demand function is assumed to be downward sloping with 0 . 
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Section 3: Methodology 
 
3.1  Perfect Competition 
In the first section, we analyze the agents’ behaviour as if they are under perfect 
competition. In a competitive market, there is an infinite number of identical 
producers, each owning a hydro plant and a gas plant. Each producer chooses 
their generation policy to maximize their own profit. Since they all face the same 
profit and cost functions and expectations of the future, the decision made by 
one producer would be identical to decisions made by the others.  Their lack of 
market power means that they all behave as price-takers. In equilibrium, in a 
perfectly competitive market, the market-clearing price that maximizes each 
producer’s profit equals the marginal cost of producing the last unit of electricity. 
Thus, the market-wide aggregate generation policy (sum of each individual 
producer’s policy) will be equivalent to the choices that would be made by a 
social planner whose intent is to maximize the total net social surplus.  
 
3.1.1 Social Planner’s Objective Function 
For a particular level of hydro generation ( tz ) and gas generation ( tm ), the flow 
of total surplus to society equals the total benefit net of generation cost and 
transmission cost, that is: 
                                                         
     
 
         [5] 
 
What the social planner really cares about at time t’ is the expected present value 
of life time total surplus starting from time t which we denote by W: 
                        
    
 
                                                     [6] 
 
We presume that the social planner owns both the hydro generation plant and 
the gas generation plant. At a particular point in time say at time zero, taking the 
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lake level 0s  and the water inflow 0y  as given, the social planner will choose the 
amount of hydro energy ( tz ) and the amount of gas ( tm ) to be used in electricity 
generation at time t such that they maximize the expected present value of life 
time total surplus W subject to their generation capacity constraints. 
 
The stochastic characteristics of inflow    and storage level     determine the 
dynamic properties of this optimization problem. While the inflow evolves 
according to the Ito process over time, the storage level in the next period is 
strongly dependent on the inflow and the choice of the amount of hydro 
generation in this period.  
 
We rewrite the value function W in terms of its corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation form1. This specifies the evolution of W and enables it to be 
calculated.  
 
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (HJB) for this maximization problem is 
the following: 
                               
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
                     [7] 
 
The details as to how we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation form are 
presented in Appendix 1.               
 
Take away the parts in the HJB that are independent of the choice of z or m, and 
we are left with social planner’s short-term objective function, 
 
                                 
  
  
  
                                          
  
  
             
   
 
              [8] 
                                                 
1
 R. E. Bellman. Dynamic Programming. Princeton, NJ, 1957. 
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In this expression, the term 
zm
dqq
0
)( represents the total benefit to society 
which is the area underneath the demand curve for a given quantity of output 
      . The term 
  
  
 is the marginal gain in the expected present value of 
total surplus ( ) given a one unit increase in storage level (s); this is what we 
call the ‚Shadow Price‛ of water. This shadow price represents the opportunity 
cost of using one more unit of water in generation as alternatively that unit of 
water could have been stored, which would cause the expected present value of 
total surplus  to increase by 
  
  
 . Therefore  
  
  
 measures the cost of producing 
  units of hydro-electricity, whereas      gives the generation cost for 
producing m units of gas-generated electricity. The terms     and      are the 
transmission costs for given levels of generation z and m.  
 
Hence, at time t, the social planner chooses the level of generation (   and   ) to 
maximize the objective function   which represents the value of total benefit to 
the society net of all the generation costs and transmission costs subject to 
generation capacity constraints. 
 
The optimization would be straightforward if we could take the shadow price of 
water 
  
  
    as given. However, the optimization problem is not as 
straightforward as a simple maximization problem. This is because in the 
dynamic setting when the inflow (y) and storage level (s) change over time, the 
shadow price of water is no longer exogenous. At time t, with water inflow    
and storage level   , the shadow price of water (   ) is determined by the 
producer’s optimal generation policy (         ) in that period. Given the 
amount of inflow    and the optimal level of hydro generation   , the storage 
level changes by     where              .  As a result, storage changes to a 
new level   . This change causes the shadow price of water to change from    to 
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   . Accordingly the optimal generation policy and storage policy have to be re-
adjusted to be consistent or optimal with respect to the new shadow price. This 
process will iterate until  ,   and  are consistent with the condition and there 
is no change. 
 
To solve for the equilibrium generation policy and storage policy we take two 
steps. Firstly, we solve for the optimal generation policy in a static setting for a 
fixed point in time, while taking the inflow ( ) and the shadow price of water 
(  ) as given. Second, we find an internally consistent optimal generation policy 
by iterating over time to the point where the generation decisions are optimal 
and consistent with the observed shadow price of water. 
 
3.1.2 Optimal generation policy in a static setting 
As we saw in section 3.1.1, in a static setting, the optimization problem faced by 
the social planner is that given the exogenous inflow from the river and a lake to 
store they need to find the generation policy (     ) that maximizes total social 
welfare 
 
                     
  
  
                
     
 
           [9] 
 
subject to generation capacity constraints, 
     , 
       
      
                                                                                                        
and some other additional constraints which depend on the inflow and the lake 
level. 
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 When the lake is neither empty nor full (       ), the social planner 
will choose the optimal levels of hydro and gas generation that maximize 
total social welfare subject to the constraints that the value for gas 
generation and for hydro generation are both non-negative and do not 
exceed the generation capacities (       and        ). Since there 
is water in storage and inflow from the river, at a particular point in time 
there is no upper bound constraint on the availability of the water. 
 
 When the lake is empty (    ), producer is unable to use more water to 
generate electricity than the amount of inflow for that particular period.  
This puts an upper bound on hydro generation. Therefore beside the 
normal non-negativity and generation capacity constraints (       
and        ) an additional constraint has to be imposed. That is the 
level of hydro generation has to be lower than the inflow from the river 
(     ) when the lake is empty. 
 
 When the lake is full (     ), the producer loses the ability to store water. 
For the amount of inflow from the river, the producer can choose either to 
use it in generation or to spill it. The shadow price for water equals zero 
when spilling takes place as if it is positive then it will be optimal to use 
this water in generation rather than spilling it. Therefore the social 
planner’s objective function depends on the inflow in that period: 
 
When there is spilling (    )      
   
                                                  
   
 
                   [10] 
 
When there is no spilling (    ) 
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       [11] 
 
The social planner will choose a pair of   and  that maximizes the objective 
function subject to the non-negativity constraints, capacity constraints and the 
extra constraint imposed on    (i.e. spilling and no spilling). The decision of 
whether to spill or not will depend on which one will provide a higher total 
social welfare. 
 
As a result, the optimization problem faced by the social planner depends on the 
amount of water in the storage lake and we optimize over a set of values of   
and  . It is useful to set up a grid that contains different combinations of   and 
 . For each pair of   and  , the social planner will be able to calculate the 
optimal generation policies (           that maximize the corresponding 
objective function. To reduce the calculation time, linear interpolation is 
employed for evaluating the optimal generation policy at combination of   and 
  that is between the points which have been calculated using the constrained 
optimization. 
 
The optimal static generation policy can therefore be summarized in 6 tables 
 
(1) Optimal hydro generation when lake is empty                 
(2) Optimal hydro generation when lake has spare capacity 
                          
(3) Optimal hydro generation when lake is full (               
(4) Optimal gas generation when lake is empty                 
(5) Optimal gas generation when lake has spare capacity 
                          
(6) Optimal gas generation when lake is full                 
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These 6 tables give the set of optimal generation policies in a static setting when 
the shadow price of water and the inflow are taken as given. The set of tables for 
the competitive market setting can be found in Section 5. 
 
3.1.3 Numerical solution method for solving the optimal generation policy in a 
dynamic setting 
 
We use policy iteration to solve for the social planner’s optimal generation 
policy in the dynamic setting on a discrete grid in       space. 
To set up the grid, let s go from      to      (              ) with 
incremental size of    and let y go from      to      (            ) with 
increment size of    – we will have a discrete grid with contains            
pairs of different combinations of storage levels and river inflow y. 
 
The starting point is an initial guess for the social planner’s generation policy as 
a function of storage level and river inflow, denoted as ),()0( ysz  and ),()0( ysm , 
                                                                                      [12] 
                                                                                               [13] 
The detailed methodology on the choice of this particular initial generation 
policy is described in Appendix 2. 
 
The equilibrium level of hydro generation, gas generation and storage satisfy the 
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation: 
 
        
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
           
     
 
          
     
     
[14]                                           
 
The finite difference method is used for approximating the first and second 
order differentials in the HJB equation.   
We can use central difference to approximate 
  
  
 and 
   
   
 as in: 
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                           [15] 
                        
   
   
        
                                
   
          [16] 
 
However, the finite difference approximation of 
  
  
 depends on the sign of 
      . Given the storage level s and river inflow  , when the optimal level of 
hydro generation is less than the amount of inflow from the lake it is optimal for 
the social planner to increase the storage level, so we use the forward difference 
to approximate the shadow price of water  . However, if the optimal level of 
hydro generation is higher than the inflow y, then the backward difference will 
be used.  
That is: 
 
When     , the HJB equation is approximated by 
 
        
                   
  
  
                     
   
 
 
 
  
                               
   
          
        
     
 
          
       
                                                                                                                [17] 
at all interior nodes            . 
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When     , it is approximated by 
 
        
                   
  
  
                     
   
 
 
 
  
                               
   
          
        
     
 
          
       
                                                                                                                     [18] 
at all interior nodes            . 
 
Given the initial guess for the generation policy, we can set up the interior 
equations after making the substitution        and        . There is one 
equation for each pair of   and  , for values of    goes from    to    and for    
goes from    to   . Thus there will be in total    values.  
 
When the storage lake is full (        ), it is impossible for the generators to 
store any more water in the lake. In such case, if the inflow is higher than the 
optimal level of hydro generation, the excess inflow has not value as it cannot be 
stored for future use.  
  
  
  has a positive value only when the optimal hydro 
generation is greater or equal to the inflow in that period.  Therefore, we impose 
a numerical boundary condition along the right boundary of the grid as follows: 
 
when        , then 
 
when z       ,                                                                                                   [19] 
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and when        ,                                                                                                [20] 
       
  
                   
  
  
                     
   
 
 
 
  
                               
   
          
        
     
 
          
       
for    from    to   . 
 
Additionally, we impose numerical boundary conditions along the top and 
bottom boundaries of the grid (for  ):  
 
For all values of storage level (  ), 
 
                                         ,               [21] 
                                     .                        [22] 
 
The finite difference equations together with the numerical boundary conditions 
(see Appendix 3) enable us to solve for the finite difference approximation to the 
social planner’s objective function for each pair of   and   in the grid, which is 
denoted by         . 
 
The shadow price of water  can be evaluated by using the finite difference 
approximation at each point       in the grid. Evaluating the shadow price for 
points inside the grid that are not on the left or right boundary is quite straight 
forward. The standard central difference approximation can be used for these: 
                                                   
                      
   
   [23] 
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However, for the combination of s and y that are lying on the left and right 
boundaries evaluating   at those points is a little bit more complicated. For the 
points along the left boundary,      . Since     is already at the lowest value for 
s,     does not exist; whereas the points lying on the right hand side boundary, 
   already represent the highest value for s therefore there is no value for     . As 
a result, different formulas have to be adopted to evaluate the shadow price   
when   is at its lowest or highest level. 
 
For        , 
 
                                  
                                 
   
   [24] 
 
For        
 
                                
                                
   
                                            [25] 
 
To see the derivation of these two formulas, see Appendix 32. 
 
After evaluating the shadow price for each point on the grid, taking the shadow 
price   and   as given we can use the optimization table we obtained in A.1 to 
update the optimal generation policy           and          which is further 
substituted into the HJB equations in order to solve for the new   and to 
evaluate the new value for    . We repeat this sequence of steps until 
convergence occurs.  
                                                 
2
 Values of   at the boundaries are calculated using the two available adjacent values to create an 
extrapolated value on the other side, by way of a second-order Taylor approximation. 
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3.2 Simulation 
 
Using the approach described in section 3.1, we can obtain the optimal 
generating policy and the optimal storage policy in a competitive market, for 
each combination of water inflow y and storage level s: 
 
- Optimal Generating Policy                        
This policy gives us the optimal gas and hydro generation given      . 
 
- Optimal Storage Policy                          
This policy tells us about the direction and magnitude of the change in the 
storage lake level and the shadow price of water   given      . 
 
To model the price behaviour in a competitive market, we use Monte Carlo 
simulation to simulate a series of water inflows ty  across time.  With the given 
series of simulated inflows we are able to compute the optimal generating policy 
and optimal storage policy. Knowing the initial value of storage and how water 
inflows evolves over time, we can use the two policies that we obtained in 
section 3.1 to understand producer’s optimal behaviour in a perfectly 
competitive market which includes the equilibrium market clearing price path, 
the amount of electricity generated by the gas plant and the amount generated 
by the hydro plant. 
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3.3  Monopoly market 
 
When the market has a monopoly structure there is only one producer in the 
market. The monopolist chooses the amount of gas generation and hydro 
generation to maximize his own profit. Since he is the only producer in the 
market, he represents the market supply and has full influence over the market 
price. In other words, he is a price-maker. Therefore at equilibrium, the market 
clearing price in a monopoly market will be the price that maximizes profit   to 
the monopolist instead of the one that maximizes total net social surplus TS, 
where 
 
                                                                       [26] 
 
In a dynamic setting, the monopolist will choose a policy that maximize the 
expected present value of life time profit  , 
 
                         
                                               
 
 
       [27] 
 
The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this maximization 
problem is in the following form 
 
                            
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
   
   
                                  [28] 
 
The objective function   that the monopolist maximizes is in the following form, 
 
                                  
  
  
                                [29] 
 
The rest of the procedures to model the optimal behaviour of the monopolist 
follow the same steps as the perfect competition case (described in section 3.1). 
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We can obtain the optimal generating policy and the optimal storage policy in 
the monopolistic market, at given inflow and storage levels. Then using these 
two optimal policies along with simulated water inflow ty  we can find out the 
market clearing price path, the amount of electricity generated by the gas plant 
and the amount generated by the hydro plant chosen by the monopolist in 
dynamic equilibrium. 
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Section 4:  Model calibration for New Zealand Electricity Market  
 
This section presents the calibration we apply to the model described in section 2 
to capture relevant characteristics of the New Zealand Electricity Market.  The 
data we use to estimate the parameters in our model are mostly available from 
public websites except the data on water inflow which is provided by New 
Zealand Electricity Commission3. For simplicity in calculation, we convert all 
generation quantity estimates into units of ‚standard unit‛, where one standard 
unit of electricity energy equals to 24727 gigawatt hours (which is the long run 
unconditional mean of water inflow). Additionally, all dollar amounts are 
measured in units of a billion dollars. 
 
4.1 Cost function for gas generation 
 
It is assumed that the cost function for non-hydro generation in New Zealand 
takes the following form         . At each generation quantity of m, the 
marginal cost of generating this quantity equals    . Therefore in our model the 
non-hydro generation has an increasing marginal cost function where the term b 
determines the rate of increase in the marginal cost of non-hydro generation. 
 
In 2007, total electricity generated by non-hydro generation is 19091 gigawatt 
hours4 which is equivalent to 0.77207 standard units of generation. For simplicity, 
though unrealistic, we assume that the only non-hydro generation option is gas 
combined cycle. Data show that, the short run marginal cost of gas combined 
cycle is at about $56 per megawatt hour if fuel of $7 per GJ is used and zero 
carbon cost; $90 per megawatt hour if using fuel that costs $10 per GJ and a 
carbon cost of $30 each tonne; and $119 per megawatt hour if the expensive fuel 
                                                 
3 Inflow data available from the centralised dataset issued by the New Zealand 
Electricity Commission. 
4 http;//www.med.govt.nz/upload/59482/00_EDF-June2008.pdf 
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of $ 13 per GJ is used with carbon cost of $50 per tonne5. If the medium level of 
marginal cost of gas generation is taken as an estimate for the marginal cost of 
non-hydro generation, the short run marginal cost of generating one standard 
unit of generation (24727 gigawatt hours) equals 2.22543 billion dollars. Given 
the quantity of non-hydro generation in 2007 and the marginal cost of generation, 
we calculate the value for the parameter b in the cost function of gas generation, 
to be 1.44121. And the cost function of non-hydro generation is      
         . However, one problem is that the quantity of non-hydro generation 
that we use in the calculation above corresponds to the market clearing quantity 
of all no-hydro generation at the market clearing price of $48.5 per megawatt 
hours, which is equivalent to $1.19926 billion per standard unit. If the marginal 
cost of $90 was used (equivalent to 2.22543 billion dollars per standard unit), 
then the marginal cost of producing the market clearing quantity of non-hydro 
generated electricity will be higher than its corresponding price. This would lead 
to a lower quantity of non-hydro generated electricity at equilibrium compared 
to the market observed level. This is because in the real world apart from gas 
generation there are many other types of non-hydro generation. Many of these 
other generation facilities have lower marginal cost of generation than  gas plant. 
Using the medium level of marginal cost of gas generation to represent the 
marginal cost at the total quantity generated by all non-hydro generations 
(which includes not only quantities generated by gas plant but also quantities 
generated by other non-hydro plants) cause an over-estimate of  the marginal 
cost of non-hydro generation.   
 
Knowing that the New Zealand electricity market has an oligopoly structure, at 
equilibrium the amount of electricity generated using non-hydro generation is 
likely to be smaller than the quantity that would have been generated in a 
                                                 
5 Short run marginal cost estimates of Taranaki Combined Cycle generation 
http://www.electricity 
commission.govt.nz/pdfs/opdev/transmis/soo/pdfssoo/2008/Final2008SOO.pdf 
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perfectly competitive market. When the market is perfectly competitive price 
equals marginal cost at the market clearing quantity. Therefore at the market 
clearing quantity, marginal cost of producing such quantity has to be no higher 
than the price.  Therefore, the market clearing price of electricity in 2007 (1.19926 
billion dollars) can serve as an upper bound for the marginal cost of non-hydro 
generation at its corresponding market clearing quantity of 0.77207 standard 
unit. Using this information, we calculate the value for b to be 0.7112.   
 
The corresponding cost function of non-hydro generation is, 
 
                                                                                                       [30] 
 
In our model we assume that the non-hydro generation has the cost function in 
the form above. This assumption biases our estimate of marginal cost upwards, 
and therefore our estimates of price-cost margins downwards. 
 
4.2 Maximum generating capacity for hydro generation and non-hydro 
generation 
 
In December 2007, the total installed generating capacity of New Zealand 
(including all sources) was 9133 megawatts. Out of this, 5366 megawatts is 
provided by hydro generating plant and the rest of 3767 megawatts belong to 
the non-hydro generating plant. 6 
 
Assuming that both of the hydro generating plant and the non-hydro generating 
plant operate twenty-four hours a day, three hundred sixty-five days a year, the 
maximum quantity of electricity that can be generated from hydro each year is 
approximately 47006.2 gigawatt hours which is equivalent to 1.901 standard 
                                                 
6 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/59482/00_EDF-June2008.pdf 
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units; and the maximum quantity of electricity that can be generated by non-
hydro generating plant in a year is 32998.9 gigawatt hours, which is equivalent 
to 1.33454 standard units. 
 
Therefore, each year the maximum capacity of hydro generation is 1.901 
standard units and the maximum capacity of non-hydro generation is 1.33454 
standard units. 
 
4.3 Storage lake capacity 
 
In 26 June 2006, the total amount of hydro energy stored in the storage lakes in 
New Zealand was 2399 gigawatt hours, which is about 54% of maximum 
capacity.7 Therefore the maximum amount of hydro energy that can be stored in 
the storage lake is 4442.6 gigawatt hours which is equivalent to 0.17967 standard 
units. 
 
4.4 Transmission cost of hydro generated electricity and of non-hydro 
electricity 
 
For simplicity, in the model we assumed that there is only one hydro generating 
plant and one non-hydro (gas) generating plant. This assumption makes it 
difficult for us to find real data that tell us the transmission cost for the two 
plants in our model, as in the real world there are multiple generating plants of 
each kind and each plant has its own transmission cost which depends on its 
own geographical location. On the other hand, the amount of data available on 
the transmission cost is very limited. Therefore it is challenging to find a cost 
value for transmitting hydro generated electricity, similarly for non-hydro 
generated electricity.  In our calibration, we use the difference between the price 
                                                 
7 http://www.electricityinfo.co.nz/media_releases/Hydrological%20Summary.pdf 
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of electricity in a high consumption area and the price at one chosen generation 
node to approximate the cost of transmitting each unit of electricity from its 
generating plant to the end users8. 
 
We choose the price of electricity at the Otahuhu node as an approximation of 
the price of electricity at consumer demand’s end. The reason for choosing 
Otahuhu is that the majority of total electricity demand in New Zealand is from 
the northern North Island area, particularly the Auckland region, and Otahuhu 
is the plant that is closest to the main demand area. The cost of transmitting 
electricity generated at Otahuhu to end users is small enough so that the price at 
the Otahuhu node can serve as a good estimate for the price to consumers. 
 
The majority of the hydro resources are in the South Island. Electricity generated 
by the hydro plants in South Island have to be transmitted through an inter-
island HVDC link across Cook Strait all the way to the main demand area in 
North Island, which leads to a high transmission cost. To capture this feature we 
use the price at Benmore node to represent the price of electricity at the hydro-
generating plant before transmission.  
 
On the other hand, unlike hydro-generating plant, gas plants have more 
flexibility in choosing their location as they are less dependent on geographical 
resources. As a result, most of the non-hydro generating plants are built in North 
Island to avoid the high cost of transmitting across inter-island HVDC link. 
Therefore we choose the price at the Haywards node as an approximation for 
the price of non-hydro generated electricity pre transmission. 
 
Data show that on average the difference between the price at Otahuhu node 
and price at Benmore node is about $7941 per gigawatt hour. The cost of 
                                                 
8
 The nodes whose prices are used to calibrate different aspects of the model are the standard three nodes 
used in the New Zealand literature as representative of the entire market. 
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transmitting 24727 gigawatt hours of hydro generated electricity is $196,357,107, 
that is the transmission cost of transmitting one standard unit of hydro 
generated electricity to its end users is about 0.19636 billion dollars.  
 
On the other hand, by comparing the price at Otahuhu with the price at 
Haywards, we find that on average for each gigawatt hour of electricity the price 
at Otahuhu is about $4087 higher than the price at Haywards. The cost of 
transmitting 24727 gigawatt hours of non-hydro generated electricity is 
$101,059,249. In other words the transmission cost of non-hydro generated 
electricity is about 0.10106 billion dollars per standard unit. 
 
4.5 Water inflow process 
 
It is assumed that water inflow follows the square-root process, that is, 
 
                                                                                                  [31] 
 
We estimate the parameters for the water inflow (  ) using the monthly water 
inflow data available from the centralised dataset issued by the New Zealand 
Electricity Commission. The original data are measured in gigawatt hours, after 
converting them into standard units, using the approach described in Appendix 
4, by fitting the square root model to monthly the water inflow data and we find 
that, for the period from July 1931 to June 20069, 
 
                                                           .                         [32] 
 
This fitted process gives a mean of 1 and standard deviation of 0.243. 
                                                 
9
 The number of observations used in the regression is 899. The adjusted R-square of the regression is 
0.982. 
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4.6 Demand function 
 
In our model we choose to use a linear demand function taking the following 
form bqaqP )( , where   and   are both constant. 
 
This is different from the demand function that Borenstein and Bushnell used for 
the California electricity wholesale market which takes the following form: 
                                                            
 
  ,                                          [33] 
where P is the market price, q the market demand, and   the price elasticity of 
demand10.  The reason for not using the curved demand function is that it has 
the same price elasticity of demand at all different prices and quantities whereas 
for the linear demand price elasticity increases as the quantity gets larger.  This 
linear demand function enables us to take into account the changes in 
consumer’s behaviour along the demand function. 
 
To estimate the value for the parameters a and b, we conduct the following 
calculations. We take the average value of electricity prices at Otahuhu, 
Haywards and Benmore as an estimate for the equilibrium price of electricity in 
New Zealand in the year of 2007, which gives $48.5 per megawatt hour. That is, 
the price of each standard unit of electricity is about $1.19926 billion.  In the 
same year, 42374 gigawatt hours of electricity were generated in New Zealand, 
which is equivalent to 1.7136733 standard units.  We set the price elasticity of 
demand at the market clearing price and quantity, equal to 0.4, which is the 
value Boreistein and Bushnell used in their 1998 paper11. Using this information 
above we calibrate the parameters in the demand function. Therefore the 
demand function for the New Zealand electricity market is, 
                                                 ;                            [34] 
                                                 
10 All of the price elasticity of demand we used in this thesis are measured in its absolute value. 
11 Boreistein and Bushnell (1998). 
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4.7 Summary of the input parameters in the New Zealand calibration 
 
Cost function of gas generation               
Hydro generation capacity 1.901 standard units 
Non-hydro generation capacity 1.33454 standard unit 
Storage lake capacity 0.17967 standard units 
Transmission cost of hydro 
generated electricity  ( k1) 
0.19636 billion dollars per standard unit 
Transmission cost of non-hydro 
generated electricity  ( k2) 
0.10106 billion dollars per standard unit 
Water inflow process                                 
Demand function 
(when       ) 
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Section 5  Results 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
In the previous section, we calibrated the model presented in Section 2 to 
capture some key characteristics of the New Zealand Electricity Market. The 
market outcomes given a certain market structure (perfect competition or 
monopoly) can be found by solving the calibrated model using the methodology 
described in Section 3. This section presents the results. 
 
Section 5.2 of this section presents the results from the standard competitive 
model. This section is divided into three parts. Section 5.2.1 presents the 
optimization results in a static setting. These results describe the optimal 
generation policies, given levels of inflow and the shadow price of water. Section 
5.2.2 presents the results of rendering the shadow price of water endogenous in 
a dynamic setting. It describes the optimal storage policy, generation policy and 
price behaviour at each given level of inflow and storage. Section 5.2.3 presents 
the outcomes of a competitive market given a simulated series of 30 years of 
daily water inflow data. 
 
Section 5.3 presents the results from the standard monopoly model. These 
results are presented in the same way as those of the competitive model. Section 
5.3.1 presents the optimization results in a static setting, and the dynamic 
optimization results are presented in section 5.3.2. Section 5.3.3 gives the results 
from the simulation. 
 
Finally in section 5.4, we will compare the results from the standard competitive 
model and from the standard monopoly model to see the difference between 
their generation policies, storage policies, price behaviours and other results. 
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5.2 Results of the standard competitive model 
 
5.2.1 Static optimization results 
As mentioned in section 3.1.2, in a static setting - the social planner chooses the 
amount of hydro and gas generation to maximize  its objective function while 
the water inflow and the shadow price of water are taken as given.  The objective 
function for the social planner is, 
 
                           
  
  
        
   
 
.       [35] 
 
The results of this approach are in accord with those of a (perfectly) competitive 
market where generators have no ability to affect prices. The social planner’s 
optimal or competitive markets’ equilibrium generation policies in this static 
setting can be summarized by the following six diagrams, which cover the 
optimal generation policy for both hydro and gas generation while the lake is 
empty, or full, or intermediate between these boundaries. 
 
(1) Optimal hydro generation when the lake is empty           ; 
(2) Optimal hydro generation when the lake has spare capacity          
  ; 
(3) Optimal hydro generation when the lake is full          ; 
(4) Optimal gas generation when the lake is empty            
(5) Optimal gas generation when the lake has spare capacity            ;      
and 
(6) Optimal gas generation when the lake is full          . 
 
Diagrams 5-1 and 5-2 shows the optimal hydro and gas generation policy for a 
social planner when the lake is neither full nor empty. For the other 4 cases, see 
Appendix 3 for details.  
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Diagram 5-1: Gas generation m* for the social planner when the Lake is 
partially full (       ) 
 
 
Diagram 5-1 shows the optimal gas generation policy of the social planner when 
the lake is neither empty nor full. When there is room for more storage, the 
optimal generation policy only depends on the shadow price of water  : it is 
not a function of the inflow level. When the marginal value of stored water    
equals zero, the social planner chooses to generate 0.242896 units of electricity 
using the gas plant which is the optimal level of gas generation given that hydro 
plant is running at its full capacity (given that the shadow price of water equals 
zero). As the shadow price of water increases from zero the social planner will 
choose to substitute more gas for hydro, until gas becomes the only source of 
electricity generation, For all   greater than this critical value, the amount of 
gas generation equals 1.29143 units. The minimum value of the shadow price    
in which the gas becomes the sole source of electricity generation is 2 (which is 
the 10th value of   in our grid). 
37 
 
 
Diagram 5-2: Hydro generation z* for the social planner when the lake is 
partially full (       ) 
 
 
Diagram 5-2 shows the optimal hydro generation policy when there is water and 
spare storage capacity in the lake, that is, when the lake is neither empty nor full. 
At a point in time, there is water inflow from the river and stored water in the 
lake, thus no upper bound is imposed on hydro generation apart from capacity 
of the plant. As a result, the optimal hydro generation policy only depends on 
the shadow price of water   : it is not a function of the inflow level. When the 
shadow price of water   is very low at a value that is close to zero, we observe 
a high level of hydro generation that is capped at its maximum generation 
capacity   . This is because when using the water is close to having no cost it is 
optimal for the social planner to generate electricity using the hydro plant as 
much as possible subject to the generation capacity constraint.  However, as    
moves away from zero to higher values, the opportunity cost of using hydro 
resource in electricity generation increases. As a result it is optimal for the social 
planner to decrease the level of hydro generation (          ) as   increases. 
This decline in    will continue as   increases until hydro generation reaches 
zero (when   takes values higher than 2).  
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5.2.2 Determining the shadow price of water 
 
We use the policy iteration method (as described in section 3.1.3) to solve for the 
social planner’s optimal generation policy in the dynamic setting on a discrete 
grid in       space. 
 
The grid is as follows:   ranges from 0 to 0.17967 12 with 20 incremental steps and 
y  ranges from 0.2 to 3.5 13 with 60 incremental steps. The initial generation 
policy is described by, 
                                                       ,                      [36] 
                                                      .                                                      [37] 
 
Results converge within 12 iterations14. The results we obtained in the first 14 
iterations for s = 0.04492 and y = 1.85 are summarized in the table below: 
 
Table 5-1: Summary of iteration results. 
 
Hydro 
z*|{s=0.04492, 
y=1.85} 
Gas 
m*|{s=0.04492, 
y=1.85} 
Shadow Price 
Ws|{s=0.04492, 
y=1.85} 
Electricity 
Price 
P|{s=0.04492, 
y=1.85} 
Starting  1.29042 0.2 1.3915 1.58985 
Iteration 1 0.446274 1.04528 1.10375 1.58786 
Iteration 2 0.813052 0.842975 0.985672 1.30011 
Iteration 3 0.963553 0.759964 0.915979 1.18203 
Iteration 4 1.05238 0.710967 0.871596 1.11234 
Iteration 5 1.10896 0.679764 0.87384 1.06796 
                                                 
9
 Maximum capacity of the storage lake, for details see Section 4.3 
10
 Given that the water inflow follows the processes described in Section 4.5, the water inflow 
level never falls below 0.3 and never exceeds 3.5. 
14
 Convergence occurs when m*, z*, Ws and P* do not change to 6 decimal places. 
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Iteration 6 1.1061 0.681341 0.873964 1.0702 
Iteration 7 1.10594 0.681428 0.873977 1.07032 
Iteration 8 1.10592 0.681438 0.873983 1.07034 
Iteration 9 1.10591 0.681442 0.873985 1.07034 
Iteration 10 1.10591 0.681444 0.873986 1.07035 
Iteration 11 1.10591 0.681444 0.873987 1.07035 
Iteration 12 1.10591 0.681445 0.873987 1.07035 
Iteration 13 1.10591 0.681445 0.873987 1.07035 
Iteration 14 1.10591 0.681445 0.873987 1.07035 
 
Diagram 5-3 below shows the optimal storage policy of the New Zealand 
calibrated model after 14 iterations.   
 
 
Diagram 5-3: Optimal storage policy in the space of storage and inflows {s,y} 
 
For the combinations of s  and y  lying in the light shaded area, the amount of 
hydro generation is chosen to be less than the inflow from the river, so the 
storage level will go up; whereas the blue shaded area represents the 
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combinations of s and y for which it is optimal for the social planner to lower the 
lake.  
 
In the New Zealand calibrated competitive model, as long as the lake is not 
empty, for any storage lake level the social planner will be willing to lower the 
storage lake (and use it in electricity generation) given that the water inflow y is 
lower than a certain level.  The minimum level of water inflow required for the 
social planner to start filling up the storage lake increases as the amount of water 
that is already in the lake increases. That is, when the water inflow is high and 
there is enough spare room in the storage lake, it is more likely that the social 
planner will choose to put more water into storage. This is because the water 
arriving is so abundant that instead of using it all in generation at present date it 
is optimal to save it for electricity generation in a future period when the inflow 
is low, and storing it now for future use is feasible since the storage level is not at 
lake capacity. This describes a smoothing process that would shift generation 
fuel between time periods and smooth aggregate generation and prices across 
time and therefore increase the overall social benefit.   
 
When the storage lake is full, the social planner can either withdraw water from 
the lake or maintain it at the current level. At any inflow level, the storage level 
cannot be increased where the lake has reached its maximum capacity. 
 
On the other hand, if the level of water inflow at the present date is low and/or 
there is little space in the storage lake, it is more likely for the social planner to 
withdraw water from the lake and use it in generation at some date. As the lake 
level increases, the shadow price of water decreases. In other words, when the 
lake level is high, the opportunity cost of using water in the lake is relatively low. 
Given that the water inflow in this period is also low, the resulting market price 
if the generators only use water from the river for hydro generation would be 
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higher than the opportunity cost of water in the storage lake. In such a case, it is 
socially optimal for the social planner to withdraw water from the storage lake 
and use it in electricity generation at that date.  
 
The optimal choice of electricity generation varies with different combinations of 
storage level and water inflow. For each combination of storage level and water 
inflow, we are able to calculate the shadow price of water         using the 
finite difference method described in section 3. Given the shadow price of water 
   and inflow level  , the optimal level of generation can be found using the 
optimal generation policies presented in section 5.2.1. Diagram 5-4 below shows 
the optimal hydro generation policy of New Zealand calibrated to the 
competitive model after 12 iterations and Diagram 5-5 presents the optimal gas 
generation policy.  
 
 
Diagram 5-4:  Optimal hydro generation in storage and inflow dimensions 
        
 
42 
 
 
Diagram 5-5:  Optimal gas generation in storage and inflow dimensions        
 
We observe that hydro generation is low when storage and inflow are both low. 
The level of hydro generation increases as storage level and/or inflow level 
increases until it reaches its maximum generation capacity.  
 
On the other hand, the gas generation serves as a substitute for hydro generation. 
The level of gas generation is the highest when the storage and inflow are both 
low, in other words when there is no hydro resource available. In this standard 
competitive model, we observe that the gas generation capacity in itself is large 
enough to satisfy the market demand even when there is no hydro resource at 
all.  Being a substitute for hydro generation, gas generation decreases as the 
storage level and/or the water inflow increasea, and stops decreasing at a certain 
positive level (          ) when hydro reaches its generation capacity.  
 
Diagram 5-6 below shows the shadow price of water as a function of storage 
lake level and inflow level. 
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Diagram  5-6: Shadow price of water in storage and inflow dimensions        
 
The shadow price of water is highest when the water inflow and the storage 
level are at zero.  
 
When the lake level is low, the amount of hydro resource that is available to be 
used in future dry (low inflow) periods is very limited. It is in those dry periods 
that each additional unit of water available increases the total surplus by a 
greater amount. Therefore the value of stored water is high when the lake level 
is currently low.  The shadow price of water would be even higher if the water 
inflow in that period is also low.  
 
When the water inflow is low, only a small quantity of electricity can be 
generated by using the ‘instant’ water from the river. If we assume that the 
social planner will choose to withdraw one unit of water from the lake using it in 
generation, then it will increase the total surplus at the present date by a large 
amount (as the total quantity of electricity generated before this unit of 
electricity generated was small due to the low inflow). Therefore each unit of 
water in the storage lake represents a high value when the inflow is low.   
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Also, when water inflow is low gas generation will be high and at a high 
marginal cost, thereby raising the value of a unit of hydro generation in this and 
perhaps in future periods. 
 
On the other hand, when the inflow from the river is low, the water resource is 
so scarce that it is very likely that the social planner will not store any additional 
water.  Given that the lake level is also low in that period, scarcity of the water 
resource in this period leads to a scarcity of the water resource in future periods 
(because the storage is low), which assigns a high value for each unit of stored 
water that is currently in the lake.  
 
When the storage lake is close to empty, the value of an additional unit of water 
from inflows equals the value of an additional unit of water in the lake as it is 
most likely that they will both be used in generating electricity immediately. 
 
As the water inflow increases and/or the lake level increases, the shadow price of 
stored water decreases since the water resource for electricity generation is more 
abundant both for now and for the future periods. The shadow price of water 
reaches its lowest value when the lake is full and the inflow is at its highest 
possible level. The shadow price of water reaches the value of zero when spilling 
take place which is when the lake is full and the amount of inflow exceeds the 
maximum generation capacity of the hydro plant.  
 
Diagram 5-7 below shows the resulting market price in a perfectly competitive 
market as a function of lake level and inflow. 
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Diagram 5-7: Market price in storage and inflow dimensions         
 
High price episodes tend to occur when both the inflow and the storage lake are 
low.  In that region, the amount of water coming from the river is low and 
therefore the amount of water that can be used in generation (without lowering 
the storage lake) at the present time is limited. At the same time the shadow 
price of water being high when the storage level is low makes it too costly for the 
social planner to withdraw water from the storage lake and use it in electricity 
generation at that date. As a result, in equilibrium, the total quantity of 
electricity in the market includes only the quantity generated using the small 
amount of inflow available together with some quantity generated by the at the 
same time expensive gas. This small overall market quantity leads to a high price 
in the market. 
 
However, as the water inflow level and storage level increase, the amount of 
instant water from the river increases and the opportunity cost of water in the 
storage decreases. As a result, a higher quantity of electricity will be generated 
using hydro plant at a lower cost which leads to a reduction in gas generation 
and an overall lower price in the market. 
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5.2.3 Simulation results 
 
Using the inflow calibration we have described, water inflow y  evolves 
according to the following square root process:  
 
                           ttttt
dydydy 9056.0)1(9448.6 
                                         [38]
 
 
Assuming that at time zero the water inflow is at its long run mean ( 1  ), we 
use the Monte Carlo simulation method to simulate a series of 30 years worth of 
daily water inflow data15, following the square root process stated above. The 
series of simulated inflow data is presented in Diagram 5-8.  
 
                        
      Diagram 5-8: Simulated water inflow y  
 
                                                 
15
 The equation for the Monte Carlo simulation is that 
  )1,0()()( 2
1
111   dtydtyyy tttt   
  )1,0()(9056.0)1(9448.6 2
1
111   dtydtyy ttt  
    where 365/1dt . 
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There are 10590 daily observations in total. These inflow data have a mean of 1 
and a standard deviation of 0.243. Most of the simulated inflow observations 
fluctuate between values of 0.5 and 1.5 except for some very dry periods; for 
example in August of the 23rd year where the inflow reaches its lowest value in 
30 years of simulation of 0.4.  There are also some high inflow episodes, for 
example from the mid of the 24th year to the end of the 26th year, with a high of 
2.4 that occurs in June year 24.  
 
The reason for choosing to simulate 30 years worth of data is that it is long 
enough to include most of the high and low episodes of water inflow that are 
possible to occur in the long run, and enables a starting level of storage of zero to 
have negligible effect. 
 
The distribution of inflow data is skewed in that there are more outliers on the 
up side than the downside. That is, the data suggest that it is more common for 
the market to have a large flood than to have a large drought. This matches with 
known properties of New Zealand water inflow. 
 
We also assume that at time zero the storage lake is close to being empty but not 
at zero16: we set the initial lake level equal to 0.001 (the capacity is 0.17967).   
 
Given the simulated 30 years of daily water inflow  ( ty  for t  from 1 to 10590) 
and initial values for storage ( 0S ), the optimal choice for the social planner of the 
generation levels and storage level in each day can be found by using the 
optimal policies calculated for the social planner. 
 
Diagram 5-9 presents the level of the optimal choice of storage over the 30 year 
window.  The average storage level over 30 years is 0.0582519 which is about 
                                                 
16
 This is to prevent falling into boundary conditions for when the lake is empty. 
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32.4 percent of the maximum lake capacity, with a standard deviation of 
0.0496936.  
 
 
Diagram 5-9:  storage lake level   
 
The social planner uses the storage lake on a frequent basis, and the pattern in 
the storage level positively responds to the fluctuations we observe in the 
simulated water inflow series with a correlation coefficient of 0.456861.  The 
planner puts more water into storage when the inflow is high, and withdraws 
from it when the inflow is low.  The standard deviation of the lake level 
(0.0496936) is however considerably smaller than the standard deviation of the 
simulated inflow (0.242992). The fluctuation in water inflow process has been 
dampened as the inflow diversifies into its two different uses at a given date – 
generation or storage. 
 
 Most of the time, the lake is not full; the lake level having been raised and 
lowered without reaching the two bounds. We see the lake being emptied 
several times within the 30 years time (for example, it is empty at the end of year 
3, the end of year 4, the end of year 11, the second quarter of year 20 and the first 
quarter of year 29).  It also reaches its maximum storage capacity, at the start of 
year 16, middle of year 24 and the middle of year 25. 
 
49 
 
Emptying the lake involves a sustained period of withdrawal which happens 
when there is a sustained long period of low water inflow. As when low inflow 
occurs, it is still best for the social planner to withdraw water from the storage 
lake and use it in electricity generation. The time it takes to use up the water in 
the lake depends on the initial level of storage before the drought starts. For 
example at the start of year 5 and the end of year 11, the storage level has been 
quite low in the past one year (less than 0.03). However, because the storage was 
low initially, a half-year period of sustained below average water inflow is 
enough to bring the storage lake to empty. On the other hand, at the start of year 
23 the storage lake is 89% full, one year of sustained below average water inflow 
brought it down to 5.5% as at the end of year 23.   
 
Similarly to have a full lake, requires a sustained level of high inflow. For 
example, in the first half of the 24th year there was a half-year long period of 
sustained above average inflows, including some historically high inflow. This 
was enough to bring the lake from 5.5 percent full to its full capacity within 6 
months despite hydro usage. 
 
Diagram 5-10 presents the optimal level of daily hydro electricity generation in 
30 years given the simulated inflow.  The average daily hydro electricity 
generation is 0.986311, which on average accounts for 56.9 percent of total 
electricity generation. 
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Diagram 5-10: Optimal hydro generation    
 
Hydro electricity generation follows the movements in the simulated water 
inflow, as the social planner tends to generate more using hydro when the 
inflow is high and cut back the hydro generation when the inflow is low. 
However, the magnitude of fluctuation in the hydro generation level is 
considerably smaller than that of the simulated water inflow, with a smaller 
standard deviation of 0.137723 comparing to a standard deviation of 0.242992 for 
the simulated inflow.  This is because part of the volatility has been smoothed by 
the use of storage. When the inflow is low, the social planner tends to have low 
hydro generation. However, the amount of hydro generation is not limited to the 
amount coming from the inflow as the social planner can withdraw water from 
the storage which was saved from the past high inflow period. On the other 
hand, when the inflow is high the social planner uses more water in generation 
but not the entire amount of inflow; instead they put some into the storage for 
use in future dry periods.  
 
However, the storage facility’s ability to smooth the hydro generation over time 
is restricted by its capacity constraints. When the storage level is low, the storage 
lake is able to smooth the hydro generation by removing the high spikes in the 
inflow process by putting plentiful hydro resources into storage. Nevertheless 
while the storage is low, it is unable to respond to a low inflow shock, as there is 
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not enough water in storage. This statement is confirmed by the behaviour of the 
first 10 years of observations. The simulated water inflow process fluctuates a lot 
within the range 0.5 and 1.5 in the first 10 years. The storage level stays at a low 
level most of the time. Comparing the hydro generation process with the 
simulated inflow process, the hydro generation process is smoother than the 
inflow process with most of the fluctuations staying within the range 0.5 and 1.0.  
Most of the remaining volatility corresponds to the low inflow shocks, 
particularly when the storage is empty, in particular at the start of year 5 and at 
the end of year 11.  On the other hand, when the storage level is close to being 
full, it is less able to smooth the high inflow shocks as storage has little scope to 
store more water. Therefore when the storage is close to being full, while the 
hydro generation is smoother on the downside, any high inflow shock will also 
lead to a spike in hydro generation level. This explains the three abnormally 
high spikes we observed in hydro generation process at the start of year 16, 
middle of year 24 and middle of year 25 
 
Hydro generation reaches its maximum capacity for two weeks in the middle of 
the 24th year. Before this occurs there had been a sustained long period of high 
inflows which gradually increased the storage level. With continuing high 
inflows, and high storage levels, hydro generation reaches its maximum capacity 
with excess water allocated to storage. Once the maximum storage level is 
reached, the residual inflow after generating hydro electricity at maximum 
capacity is spilled. This is the only occasion when spilling occurs. This can be 
more clearly observed in the following three diagrams which zoom in to take a 
close look at the 36 observations for hydro generation, storage and the difference 
between inflow and hydro generation (inflow net of hydro) around the time 
when spilling occurs. 
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Diagram 5-11: Storage (for t from 23.6 to 23.7) 
 
 
Diagram 5-12: Hydro generation (for t from 23.6 to 23.7) 
 
 
Diagram 5-13: Inflow net of  hydro generation (for t from 23.6 to 23.7) 
 
Diagram 5-14 presents the optimal level of gas generation over the 30 years 
given the simulated water inflow. The average daily gas generation is 0.747411, 
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which on average accounts for 43.1 percent of total electricity generation.  
Compared to the hydro generation, gas generation has a smaller volatility with 
standard deviation of 0.0759636. 
 
 
Diagram 5-14: Optimal gas generation *m  
 
We observe that in the 30 years of daily observations, gas has been used as a 
substitute for hydro generation with a correlation coefficient between the two 
sources of generation of negative one. The reason for gas being a perfect 
substitute for hydro generation is that certain model features have guaranteed 
gas generation being at an interior solution – the low transmission cost of gas 
guarantees a positive level of gas generation while the generation capacity of the 
gas plant is large enough to avoid a maximum gas generation capacity.  Given 
that the marginal cost function of the gas plant is linear, being in an interior 
solution all the time means that we are always moving up and down the 
marginal cost of gas generated electricity. As a result, gas always serves as a 
perfect substitute for hydro generation as long as the gas plant does not reach its 
boundary17. However, though the correlation coefficient equals negative one, the 
rate of substitution between the two sources of generation is not one-for-one, 
                                                 
17 This perfect substitution between the two generations breaks down when the gas 
generation capacity is small.  
54 
 
that is why we observe fluctuations in the market quantity and price, which is 
observable in Diagram 5-15 below, instead of being constant over time. 
 
At each point in time, the amount of hydro generation and the amount of gas 
generation sum up to the total quantity generated in the electricity wholesale 
market. The market price coincides with the intersection of the market demand 
curve and this given aggregate quantity. 
 
Diagram 5-15 presents the market price in the 30 year period.  
 
Diagram 5-15:  Market electricity price *P  
 
The average market price over the 30 years is 1.16418. The standard deviation of 
the market price 18 , which is equal to 0.108051, is lower than the standard 
deviation of the hydro generation, but higher than the standard deviation of the 
gas generation. 
 
The standard deviation of the price is considerably smaller than the standard 
deviation of the simulated water inflow and it is also smaller than the standard 
deviation of the hydro generation. This is because the storage enables smoothing 
                                                 
18 The standard deviation of market price does not equal the standard deviation of the 
market quantity, as the coefficient on quantity in the inverse demand function does not 
equal negative one. 
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in hydro generation across time which first removes part of the volatility in the 
water inflow and left the hydro generation with a smaller standard deviation 
relative to the volatility in inflow. Then the gas generation further smoothes the 
total quantity by substituting with hydro generation in each given period; the 
extent depending upon the state of storage and inflows. 
 
The price process is generally stable except for three significant price falls which 
occur at the start of year 16, mid of year 24 and 25. These large price drops 
correspond to the high spikes we observe in the hydro generation process, which 
occurs when there is a high inflow while the storage is full. The abnormally high 
hydro generation leads to a high overall generation and a low market price. 
 
Though the shadow price of water is not directly observable to the market, we 
are able to calculate its value using our model. Diagram 5-16 presents the value 
of the shadow price of water over the 30 year period. 
 
 
Diagram 5-16:  Shadow price of water Ws  
 
The value of the shadow price of water over the thirty years has an average of 
0.964722, with a standard deviation of 0.0981244. 
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The shadow price of water is negatively correlated with the storage lake level 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.830091, and is also negatively correlated with 
the inflow level with a correlation coefficient of -0.790925. The value of each 
additional unit of stored water is low when the water resource is abundant 
which include both the amount in the storage and the amount from the inflow. 
However, the size of the correlation coefficients suggests that the shadow price 
of water reacts to a change in the storage lake level slightly more aggressively 
than it reacts to a change in the inflow level (both negatively) while holding 
other variables constant. 
 
On the other hand, the shadow price of water is closely and positively correlated 
with the market price with a correlation coefficient of 0.985153. In general the 
market price equals the shadow price of water at that time plus the cost of 
transmitting one unit of hydro generated electricity, except at times when 
storage is either empty or full. When the lake is empty, the social planner loses 
its ability to use more hydro resource in electricity generation other than the 
amount he has extracted from the inflow in that period. If the inflow in that 
period is small, in equilibrium the social planner would like to use more hydro 
resource in generation than what the inflow provides. However, since the 
storage is empty, in equilibrium the social planner will choose to put all inflow 
into generation and the resulting equilibrium price exceeds the summation of 
the shadow price of water and the transmission cost of hydro generated 
electricity.  On the other hand, when the storage lake has reached its full 
capacity, it loses its ability to store more water. Since no additional water can be 
stored for future use, the opportunity cost of water is positive only for the 
amount of water stored in the lake. There is no opportunity cost of using water 
coming from the water inflow as other than being used in generation they will 
have to be spilled. As a result, we observe big drops in the shadow price of 
water in periods where the storage is full, for example at the start of year 16, the 
mid of year 24 and 25.  The drop was particularly sharp in the mid of year 24, as 
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that is when the amount of water inflow exceeded the hydro generation capacity, 
and excess water had to be spilled which bought the shadow price of water 
down to a very low number. 
 
 
5.3 Results of the monopoly model 
 
The approach to solving the monopolist’s problem is similar to the social 
planner’s except instead of maximizing social welfare, the monopolist aims at 
maximizing its profit. His objective function is therefore the following, 
                                
  
  
               .     [39] 
Since the static optimization results are largely qualitatively similar to the social 
planner’s, we will skip those and jump straight to the simulation results. The 
diagrams of the static optimization can be found in Appendix 6. 
 
5.3.1 Simulation results 
 
To study the outcomes in a monopoly electricity market and ensure that the 
environment we impose in this market is consistent with the one we imposed in 
the competitive market (in order to conduct valid comparison between the 
outcomes of those two models), we use the same series of simulated inflow data 
as the one we used for the standard competitive model in section 5.2.3. The 
series of simulated inflow data is presented in Diagram 5-8.  
 
Given the simulated 30 years of daily water inflow  ( ty  for t from 0 to 10590) and 
initial values for storage (  ), the profit-maximizing choice for the monopolist 
generator of the generation levels and storage level in each day can be found by 
using the optimal policies calculated in section 5.3.2. 
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Diagram 5-17 presents the level of the optimal storage over the 30 year window.  
The average storage level over 30 years is 0.0887507 which is about 49 percent of 
the maximum lake capacity, with a standard deviation of 0.059552.  
 
 
Diagram 5-17: Storage lake level s  in a monopoly market 
 
The monopolist generator uses the storage lake on a very frequent basis, and the 
pattern in the storage level positively responds to the fluctuations we observe in 
the simulated water inflow series with a correlation of 0.40272. The fluctuation in 
water inflow has been dampened as the inflow diversifies into its two different 
uses at a given date – being used in generation or being stored. The storage 
serves to reallocate the water resources across time. As a result, we observe that 
the standard deviation of the lake levels (0.0595522) is considerably smaller than 
the standard deviation of the simulated inflow (0.242992). 
 
The lake reaches its maximum capacity for decent periods of time, especially 
during the periods of high inflows for example in periods between year 15 and 
year 18, and in periods between year 24 and 28. Also during those periods, it 
tends to keep the lake full for quite a while before it starts withdrawing water 
from it. The lake was kept at full capacity for close to a year (in year 14 and15) 
before being drawn down.  
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In other periods we observe frequent actions being taken: raising and lowering 
the lake. In general, compared to the storage level in the competitive model, the 
monopoly generator tends to have a higher level of storage. At a given level of 
high inflow, the monopoly generator in general puts more water into storage 
relative to what the social planner in a competitive market setting would have 
done. This is reflected in the fact that the mean of 30 years of storage levels in the 
monopoly market is higher than the mean of storage levels in the competitive 
market (mean of storage level equals 0.0887507 in the monopoly market and 
equals 0.0582519 in the competitive market). This is because to achieve a higher 
profit, the monopoly generator has an incentive to keep the hydro generation 
level and the overall electricity generation level low to maintain the market price 
at a high level.   
 
In fact, the monopoly generator never completely empties the lake in the 30 
years. Though the storage level in periods around the end of year 4 and the 
second quarter of year 19 seem to be quite close to zero, they never actually 
reach zero. This can be seen more clearly in the following Diagram 5-18 which 
zooms in to take a closer look at the observations for lake level at values between 
0 and 0.01. 
 
 
Diagram 5-18: Storage levels in a monopoly market that have values between 0 
and 0.01 
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The blue curve in Diagram 5-19 presents the optimal level of daily hydro 
electricity generation in 30 years given the simulated inflow.  The average daily 
hydro electricity generation is 0.962985, which on average accounts for 86.6% 
percent of total electricity generation. 
 
 
Diagram 5-19: Optimal hydro generation *z  in a monopoly market 
 
Hydro electricity generation follows the movements in the simulated water 
inflow, more on the down side rather than on the up side. The monopoly 
generator tends to cut back the hydro generation when the inflow is low 
whereas when the inflow is high the generator increases the amount of hydro 
generation until its unconstrained optimal level of hydro generation is achieved 
(at 1.0821 units), and the remaining inflow is placed into the storage if there is 
spare capacity in the lake, otherwise it is spilled. The use of storage and spilling 
assigns the hydro generation level a much smaller volatility relative to of the 
simulated water inflow, with a standard deviation of 0.0753554 comparing to a 
standard deviation of 0.242992 for the simulated inflow.  
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The two big drops in the hydro generation levels occur in periods from the 
fourth quarter of year 4 till the first quarter of year 5, and in periods in year 20 
and both took place when there was a sustained period of low inflows along 
with a low lake level. For example during these low inflow periods in the end of 
year 4 and beginning of year 5 (which lasted for approximately 135 days), the 
monopoly generator not only uses all the inflow in hydro generation in each 
period, but also withdraws water gradually over time to contribute towards 
hydro generation. This gradual lowering of the lake causes the lake to reach a 
level that is very close, but not equal to, zero (approximately 0.001). At this point, 
the hydro generation is at one of its lowest levels in 30 years, at 0.54 units. After 
that the inflow level increases. However, we expect to see that if the inflow 
remains at low levels for even a small number of periods, the lake level will soon 
be completely depleted and there will be an even sharper drop in hydro 
generation.  
 
Hydro generation reaches its unconstrained optimal level quite often in periods 
in years from 15 to 18 and from 24 to 28. In these periods, in general both the 
inflows and the storage levels are high. The hydro resources from both of the 
sources above provide the monopoly generator with an amount of water that is 
more than he wants and essentially removes the hydro resources constraint.  
Spilling occurs when the inflow exceeds the amount of water required for 
generating the unconstrained optimal level of hydro generation ( 0821.1y ) 
while the lake is full.  This is a voluntary spilling as instead of spilling the water 
the monopoly generator could use it in hydro generation as the generation 
capacity of the hydro plant has not been reached. However, the monopolist 
generator chooses to generate at the unconstrained optimal level which is below 
the maximum capacity to make sure the price does not go too low, as this 
maximizes his profit.  
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The purple curve in Diagram 5-19 presents the optimal level of gas generation 
over the 30 years given the simulated water inflow. The average daily gas 
generation is 0.147672, which on average accounts for only 13.7 percent of total 
electricity generation.  Compared to hydro generation, gas generation has a 
smaller volatility with a standard deviation of 0.0535763. 
 
We observe that in the 30 years of daily observations, gas has been used as a 
substitute for hydro generation with a correlation coefficient between the two 
sources of generation equal to negative one. The reason for gas being a perfect 
substitute for hydro generation all the time is that certain model features have 
guaranteed gas generation being at an interior solution – the low transmission 
cost of gas guarantees a positive level of gas generation while the generation 
capacity of the gas plant is large enough to avoid a maximum gas generation 
capacity.  Given that the marginal cost function of the gas plant is linear, being in 
an interior solution all the time means that we are always moving up and down 
the marginal cost of gas generated electricity. As a result, gas always serves as a 
perfect substitute for hydro generation as long as the gas plant does not reach its 
boundary. However, though the correlation coefficient between hydro 
generation and gas generation is negative one, the substitution between the two 
sources of generation is not one-for-one, that is why we observe fluctuations in 
the market quantity and price, which is observable in Diagram 5-19, instead of 
being constant over time. 
 
Diagram 5-20 presents the market price in the 30 year period.  
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Diagram 5-20:  Market electricity price *P  in the monopoly market 
 
The average market price over the 30 years in the New Zealand calibrated 
monopoly market is 2.25426. The volatility of the market price is smaller than the 
volatility of hydro generation and gas generation, with standard deviation of 
0.0381036. The reason for having a smaller volatility deviation is that the 
difference between the standard deviations of the two sources of generation is 
relative smaller (with standard deviation for hydro equal to 0.0753554, and 
standard deviation for gas equal to 0.0535763). Most of the volatility in hydro 
generation and in gas generation cancels out as one substitutes for the other 
which brings an overall lower volatility for the market quantity and market price. 
19 
The standard deviation of the price is much smaller than the standard deviation 
of the simulated water inflow and it is also smaller than the standard deviation 
                                                 
19 Given that the demand is linear expressed in form of                , 
                                             
                                        
, and as the correlation coefficient between  and   (      ) equals -1, 
                                      ; 
If              , 
                                        . 
That is, the closer the value of        and        are to each other, the smaller the 
      ; when they equal,         . 
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of the hydro generation. The gas generation further smoothes the total quantity 
by substituting with hydro generation in each given period which brings a lower 
standard deviation to prices. 
 
In this price series, there are a number of high spikes which correspond to 
periods with low storage and low inflow. However, there is no significant price 
falls, as the monopoly uses the storage to control the level of hydro generation 
when inflow is high in order to ensure the price does not fall below 2.196887 
(which is the price at when hydro generation equals its un-constrained optimal 
level, 07645.1z ).   
 
Though the shadow price of water is not directly observable to the market, we 
are able to calculate its value using our model. Diagram 5-21 presents the value 
of the shadow price of water in the monopoly model over the 30 years period. 
 
 
Diagram 5-21:  Shadow price of water   
 
The shadow price of water over the thirty years has an average level of 0.11452, 
with a standard deviation of 0.0690524. 
 
The shadow price of water is negatively correlated with the storage lake level 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.891693, and is also negatively correlated with 
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the inflow level with a correlation coefficient of -0.658662. The value of each 
additional unit of stored water is low when the water resource is abundant 
which include both the amount in the storage and the amount from the inflow. 
However, the size of the correlation coefficients suggest that the shadow price of 
water reacts to a change in the storage lake level more than it reacts to a change 
in the inflow level (both negatively) while holding other variables constant. 
 
On the other hand, the shadow price of water is closely and positively correlated 
with the market price with a correlation coefficient of 0.987728. Most of the time, 
the summation of the shadow price of water at that time and the cost of 
transmitting one unit of hydro generated electricity equals the marginal revenue 
earned by the monopoly generator at the given quantity (which is smaller than 
the price at that quantity), except at times when the storage lake is full.20 When 
the lake reaches its full storage capacity, it loses its ability to store more water. 
Since no additional water can be stored for future use, the opportunity cost of 
water is positive only for the amount of water stored in the lake. There is no 
opportunity cost of using water from the inflow as other than being used in 
generation it will have to be spilled. As a result, we observe low values of 
shadow price of water in periods where the storage is full, for example in some 
periods from year 15 to year 18, and from year 24 to 28. During these periods, if 
the inflow is greater than the amount needed to generate the unconstrained 
optimal level of hydro generation, the corresponding shadow price of water 
equals zero and that is when spilling takes place. 
 
  
                                                 
20
  We do not need to consider the case when the lake is empty in this monopoly model, as in this model 
the generator never empties the lake. For details see Diagram 5-33. 
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5.4 Comparison between the competitive model and the monopoly model 
 
In this section, we compare the results from the standard competitive model and 
from the standard monopoly model. In part one, we look at the difference 
between the price behaviours and generation policies of a competitive market 
and those of the monopoly market; In part two, we look at the differences in 
their storage policies and the value of the storage lake; In the last part, we will 
discuss the differences in their resulting welfare consequences. 
 
5.4.1 Market outcomes 
Given the simulated series of 30-year of daily inflow data (as presented in 
Diagram 5-12), we calculated the optimal level of generation and the market 
equilibrium price in each period, first in a competitive market and then in a 
monopoly market. Table 5-2 below summaries the statistical information, which 
includes mean and standard deviation, on price, hydro-generation and gas 
generation of the competitive model and of the monopoly model. 
 
Table5-2 : Competition and monopoly market outcomes compared 
Quantity Mean Standard Deviation 
 Competitive Monopoly Competitive Monopoly 
Inflow (  ) 1 1 0.242992 0.242992 
Storage (  ) 0.0582519  0.088751 0.0496936 0.059552 
Price (  ) 1.16418 2.25462 0.108051 0.0381036 
Hydro generation 
(  ) 
0.986311  0.962985 0.137723 0.0753554 
Gas generation 
(  ) 
0.747411  0.147672 0.0759636 0.0535763 
Shadow price of 
water (  ) 
0.964722 0.11452 0.0981244 0.0690524 
Marginal cost of 
gas (   ) 
1.06312 0.210049 0.108051 0.0762069 
Total surplus (TS) 3.97381 3.36082 0.126744 0.053851 
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Given the same series of inflows, we observe higher prices and lower quantity in 
the monopoly market relative to the competitive market. The differences 
between the prices and quantities in these two markets are considerable, with 
the average value of the market equilibrium prices in the monopoly market 
being 86 percent higher than the average value of the market equilibrium prices 
in the competitive market and the average value of the market equilibrium 
quantities in the monopoly market being 36 percent lower than the average 
market quantity in the competitive market, over 30 years. 
 
The reason for having these big differences is that the decision makers in these 
two markets have different objectives: the monopoly generator aims at 
maximizing his own profit whereas the social planner aims at maximizing the 
total surplus to the society which includes not only the surplus to the producers 
but also the surplus to consumers. As a result, it is typical to see higher quantity 
and lower prices in a competitive market relative to a monopoly market, as in 
such a way it transfers some of the producer surplus in the monopoly market 
into consumer surplus, and captures the otherwise dead-weight-loss (as if in a 
monopoly market) and in such a way maximizes the total surplus in the society. 
 
The smaller quantity generated in the monopoly market reflects lower levels in 
both, hydro generation and gas generation. However, we observe that the 
monopoly generator tends to cut back more on the gas generation than on the 
hydro generation compared to the social planner’s generation decision. As a 
result, the share of hydro generation in the total generation is significantly 
different under different market structures – it accounts for only 56.9 percent of 
total electricity generation if the market is competitive and accounts for 87.5 
percent if the market is run by a monopoly generator. This is because if the 
market is competitive, the social planner chooses to generate a high quantity of 
electricity in equilibrium, in order to maximize the total surplus to the society. 
At the equilibrium level, hydro generation itself is not big enough or too costly 
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(especially in those low inflow periods) to satisfy all the demand as a result we 
see on average relatively even weights between hydro and gas generations. 
However, the monopoly generator chooses the quantity at the level where 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. As a result, the total quantity of 
electricity generated that we observe in the monopoly market is considerably 
smaller even if they have the same cost structure as the competitive market. 
However, the supply can be different as the monopoly tends to have lower 
opportunity cost of .  
 
In equilibrium the monopoly generator generates only a small quantity of 
electricity in total to some extent relaxes the constraint on the availability of 
water resources, and therefore decreases the opportunity cost of water. More 
specifically, given the inflow level, a smaller quantity of hydro generation 
chosen by the monopoly generator (relative to the amount that would be chosen 
by the social planner) leads to either a bigger increase in lake level (if the inflow 
is high), or a smaller decrease in lake level (if the inflow is low), which leads to a 
lower cost of water in the future period. This decrease in the value of water 
encourages the monopoly generator to use more hydro in generation as a 
percentage of its total generation. As a result, comparing to the social planner’s 
choice, the monopoly generator will run the cheap hydro generation, and cut 
back heavily on the expensive gas generation. 
 
On the other hand, also due to the lower shadow price of water, the monopoly 
generator turns on hydro generation at lower prices compared to the social 
planner.  Therefore we observe that, although there is a smaller overall hydro 
generation in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market, the 
difference between the two hydro generation levels is not as big as for the gas 
generation. 
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Knowing that the monopoly generator in general chooses a lower quantity of 
generation relative to the social planner, most of the upside fluctuation in the 
hydro generation and the downside fluctuation in the gas generation will be 
avoided in the monopoly market. This is because when the water inflow is high, 
though the water resource is abundant and the marginal cost of water is cheap, 
the monopoly generator has no interest in generating any more than his un-
constrained profit-maximizing level of hydro generation. As a result, in periods 
when inflows are high, the big increase in hydro generation and decrease in gas 
generation that we see in the competitive market will not be observed in the 
monopoly market. This leads to smaller standard deviation of hydro generation, 
gas generation and price in the monopoly market relative to the competitive 
market. 
 
Given the same storage capacity and same series of inflows, the monopoly 
generator tends to put more water in storage than the social planner would 
choose, and the lake level in the monopoly market is more volatile than it is in 
the competitive market.  
 
To maximize its profit, the monopoly generator chooses to generate a smaller 
amount of electricity than the social planner, including hydro generation. The 
difference between the hydro generation levels in these two markets is 
particularly significant in periods where the inflows are high. As a result, in 
periods with high inflows the monopoly generator chooses to use less water in 
generation and store more in the lake, relative to the social planner. In the dry 
periods, the social planner would withdraw water from the lake more 
aggressively to increase the amount of hydro generation (and total generation) 
in order to restrain the price from becoming too high. On the other hand, the 
monopoly generator does not have such a problem with having a high price, 
consequently it would not lower the lake as much as the social planner would in 
dry periods. As a result the average lake level in the monopoly market over the 
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30 years is higher than the average lake level in the competitive market. The 
difference between the lake levels in the monopoly market and the competitive 
market is larger when the inflow is high (the storage level chosen by the 
monopoly in these periods tends to be considerably higher than the level chosen 
by the social planner, and the monopoly generator tend to fill up the lake more 
often than the social planner), and lower when the inflow is low.  As a result, the 
monopoly market has a bigger standard deviation of lake level relative to the 
competitive market. 
The difference between the mean of inflow and the mean of hydro generation 
over 30 years can be considered as a good approximation for the average level of 
spilling each year21. We observe that the monopoly generator on average does 
much more spilling than the social planner.  
 
The storage lake is more valuable to the social planner than to the monopoly 
generator. Using the dynamic optimization policies we solved for the monopoly 
generator in section 5.3.2, we are able to calculate the expected present value of 
all future profits at the point where the lake is empty and inflow is at its long run 
mean level (that is            which equals 57.0064.  This value represents 
the value of an empty lake with a maximum storage capacity of 0.17967 to the 
monopoly generator22. We calculate this value again as if it is in a competitive 
market. That is, we calculate the expected present value of all future net social 
surpluses under the competitive policies, which gives             83.9638. 
This value gives us the value of an empty lake to the social planner, given that 
the lake has the same size of 0.17967. It is 47 percent higher than the value to the 
monopoly generator.  
                                                 
21 Though in each period the difference between the inflow and the hydro generation 
may not necessarily be spilling as it may be increasing the  lake level, the effect of 
increasing storage on this difference can be ignored when the average has been take 
over 30 years of 10950 observations.  
22 It is the value of the storage lake plus all of the other industry structure (i.e., the 
generators themselves). 
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The lake is more valuable to the social planner than to the monopolist because it 
plays a more important role in a competitive market. Instead of serving as just a 
place to store un-used water rather than spilling it, the storage facility helps the 
social planner allocate water resource across different periods. This ability to re-
allocate water resource over time can increase the total quantity of electricity 
generated in the dry periods, prevent occurrence of very high prices and 
therefore significantly increases the net social surplus in these periods.  As a 
result, if both the social planner and the monopoly generator can choose the size 
of storage capacity they want to build, we expect to see that the social planner 
has an incentive to build a larger storage facility than the monopoly generator.  
 
 
We measure the benefit to the generator in a given market structure by 
calculating the profit in that market. We define the profit in a given market in a 
given date to be the total revenue at the equilibrium market quantity in that 
period less the generation cost and the transmission cost of gas generation at its 
equilibrium level and the cost of transmitting the hydro generated electricity. 
The opportunity cost of water which is captured by the shadow price of water is 
not included as a cost in this profit calculation. Though its value is taken into 
account in the generator’s decision making, the shadow price of water is an 
opportunity cost (value in its alternative use in some other future period) rather 
than an actual monetary cost to the generator has to pay in that period whereas 
the profit measures the actual monetary return to the generator after paying off 
all the monetary costs of generation and transmission.  
 
We measure the benefit to society in a given market structure by calculating the 
net social benefit in that market. Net social benefit in a given market in a given 
period is defined as the total surplus at the market equilibrium quantity (which 
is the area under the demand curve up to the market equilibrium quantity) 
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taking away the monetary cost of generation and transmission which include the 
generation cost and transmission cost of gas-generated electricity at the 
equilibrium level, and the cost of transmitting the hydro-generated electricity. 
Similarly to the profit calculation, the opportunity cost of water is also excluded 
from the net social benefit calculation as it is not an actual monetary cost.  
 
The profit and the net social benefit in the competitive market and in the 
monopoly market at their own equilibrium quantities is calculated in each 
period over 30 years. The mean of the profit and the net social benefit in these 
two markets are summarized in the following table (Table 5-3): 
 
 Competitive market Monopoly market 
Profit 1.39434 2.27974 
Net social surplus 3.9384 3.35251 
Table 5-3: Mean of profit and net social surplus in the two markets 
 
The average level of profit per day in the monopoly market is 63.5 percent 
higher than the average level of daily profit earned in the competitive market. 
That is, the under-generation and over-pricing exercised by the monopoly 
generator relative to the social planner’s social surplus maximizing price and 
quantity choice have earned the monopoly generator a big profit.  
 
Besides the fact that the monopoly generator maintains a much higher profit 
than the social planner, each market’s profit response to inflow shocks is also 
different. The profit level in the competitive market tends to fluctuate a little 
over time and profit decreases significantly when high inflow comes while the 
lake is full. This is because in the competitive market electricity is supplied at its 
marginal cost, the profit in this market arise from the opportunity cost of water 
as it is a cost that has been taken into consideration for deciding the optimal 
generation but is not deducted from the revenue in profit calculation as it does 
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not associate with any cash out-flow. In the periods where the storage is close to 
being full or is full and the inflow is high, the stored water loses a considerable 
amount of value. Additionally, in these periods since the storage is full the 
inflow has to be used in generation or be spilled (if the hydro plant reaches its 
maximum generation capacity). The social planner will choose to use hydro 
generation as much as he can which leads to a big increase in the total quantity 
generated and a big decrease in the market price. Particularly low price and high 
quantity bring the social planner a much lower profit. Therefore we observe a 
significant decrease in profit in the competitive market during these periods.  
 
On the other hand, the monopoly generator maintains the profit at a high level 
steadily without much fluctuation. This is because in these periods, the 
monopoly generator only runs the hydro generation plant up to the un-
constrained profit-maximizing quantity. The remaining inflow in excess of the 
needed amount will be spilled. As a result the price in the monopoly market is 
well maintained above a certain level and therefore no significant decrease in 
profit occurs during these periods. However, we do observe decreases in the 
profit level when low inflow occurs while the lake is close to being empty. This 
is because in these periods, the amount of water resource is limited and there is 
not much the monopoly generator can do about it because the lake level is also 
low (close to or equal to zero). As a result, the monopoly generator has to 
decrease the hydro generation and substitute some with the expensive gas 
generation, which leads to high price and low quantity in these periods and 
brings the monopoly generator a lower profit.  
 
The social planner does bring a higher net social benefit to the society than the 
monopoly generator in each period. The average level of net social benefit per 
day in the competitive market is 17.5 percent higher than the average level of 
daily net social benefit produced in the monopoly market. The lower price and 
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higher quantity of generation chosen by the social planner could make the 
society much better off relative to the monopoly generator.  
 
In the competitive market, the net social benefit increases significantly in periods 
when hydro generation is particularly high. This occurs in periods with high 
inflows while the storage lake is full. In these periods, the non-availability of the 
storage lake and the abundance of the water resource from the inflow give the 
social planner incentive to generate a small amount of electricity using gas at 
low cost and a large amount of hydro-generated electricity subject to the 
generation capacity of the hydro plant. The large quantity of electricity is 
supplied to the market at a low price. The low price and high quantity bring a 
big total surplus. After taking away the low cost of gas generation (because only 
a small quantity is generated) and the transmission costs, the society is left with 
a big net social benefit in these periods. 
 
On the other hand, social benefit decreases in periods when the inflow is low 
while the storage is empty. In these periods, the social planner has very little 
water that can be used in hydro generation. This situation can not be improved 
by the existence of the lake as there is no water in the lake. As a result, the social 
planner has to substitute hydro generation with the more expensive gas 
generation. Overall in equilibrium low quantity will be supplied to the market at 
high price which leads to a low net social benefit to the society. 
 
Though the net social benefit gained in the monopoly market is much lower in 
the competitive market, similar decreases in the net social benefit during these 
low inflow empty storage periods are also found in the monopoly market. 
However, no high net social benefit is observed in the monopoly market in 
periods when the inflow is high and the storage is full because unlike the social 
planner the monopoly generator does not use all the inflow in hydro generation. 
To maximize its profit, the monopolist only runs the hydro plant up to the un-
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constrained profit maximizing level. Therefore the price in the monopoly market 
is maintained in these periods and society does not get the much benefit of a low 
price or high quantity as it does from the competitive market. 
 
The difference between the net social benefit gained in the competitive market 
and the net social benefit gained in the monopoly market in each period 
measures the loss of social welfare by having absolute market power in the 
market. The loss caused by market power is greater in periods where the 
monopoly generator is able to withhold back the generation when there are 
enough resources for a large quantity to be generated at low cost (i.e. when the 
inflow is high and the lake is full). The loss to the society is smaller in periods 
when the inflow is small and the lake is empty, because in these periods both the 
social planner and the monopoly generator are constrained by the availability of 
water and both markets will have a relatively low net social benefit. However, 
the social planner always chooses a higher quantity of total generation than the 
monopoly generator and in these dry periods most of this difference in 
generation levels is generated by the gas plant. Therefore, although the social 
planner in equilibrium supplies a higher quantity at lower price relative to the 
monopoly generator which brings a higher total surplus to the market, the 
additional cost of generating more gas-generated electricity at increasingly high 
cost, and additional transmission costs make the loss to the society caused by 
market power smaller in dry periods. 
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Diagram 5-22:  Comparison between the market outcomes generated in a 
competitive market and in a monopoly market (blue curve for the competitive 
case and purple curve for the monopoly case): 
 
Storage level                                             Shadow price of water  
 
Hydro generation                                      Gas generation 
  
Equilibrium price                                         Net Social benefit            
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Section 6 Comparative statics analysis 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
In the previous section, we presented the equilibrium market outcomes of the 
standard New Zealand calibrated model given the simulated 30 years of daily 
water inflow, assuming the perfect competitive market. In this section, we will 
undertake a number of comparative statics of the standard model by altering 
some market condition. We consider the effect of different prices for gas. We also 
explore variation in climatic related variable which is the river inflows. 
 
6.2 Comparative statics of the competitive model 
 
6.2.1 Capacity of the gas generation plant 
 
In this section we analyze the impact that the generation capacity of the gas 
generation plant has on the market outcomes in the competitive setting, in 
particular when the capacity of low marginal cost gas generation changes. We 
do this by changing the maximum capacity of the gas generation, rotating the 
marginal cost function of the gas generation so that the marginal cost of 
generating the maximum amount of gas generation is still the same, equal to the 
market clearing price minus the transmission cost. In this way by increasing or 
decreasing the generation capacity we are actually adding or taking away the 
low marginal cost portion of gas production. Having a small generation capacity 
would imply a higher marginal cost at each given quantity. 
 
In the standard model we set the maximum generation capacity of the gas 
generation equal to 1.33454. We will compare the market outcomes generated 
under the standard setting with the ones generated given a 60% increase and 
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decrease in the maximum generation capacity of gas generation to study the 
impact of the gas generation capacity on the market outcomes in a competitive 
market. Table 6-1 summarizes the market outcomes given these three different 
gas generation capacity. 
 
Table 6-1: market outcomes at different generation capacity of the gas 
plant 
Quantity 60% higher   60% lower   
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Inflow (  ) 1 0.24299 1 0.24299 
Storage (  ) 
1.027523 
 
1.180555 
 
0.988736 
 
1.002194 
 
Price (  ) 
0.778922 
 
0.759281 
 
1.427616 
 
1.479907 
 
Hydro generation 
(  ) 
0.999901 
 
1.000603 
 
1.00004 
 
1.00016 
 
Gas generation 
(  ) 
1.21421 
 
1.214855 
 
0.585885 
 
0.575156 
 
Shadow price of 
water (  ) 
0.73714 
 
0.769888 
 
1.509068 
 
1.461834 
 
Net social benefit 
(NSB) 
1.046712 
 
0.732808 
 
0.909735 
 
1.513156 
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Diagram 6-1: Comparison between the market outcomes generated in a 
competitive market given three different generation capacities of the gas 
generation (purple for the case with dam size in the standard calibration, yellow 
for the case with 60% larger generation capacity of gas and blue for the case 60% 
lower generation capacity of gas): 
 
Storage Shadow price of water 
 
 
 
 
Hydro Gas 
  
Price  
  
 
 
We find that given an increase in the gas generation capacity there is a 
significant increase in the amount of gas generation used at equilibrium. It is 
obvious that an increase in the low marginal cost gas generation capacity leads 
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to an increase in the amount of gas generation at equilibrium in a competitive 
market. This is because an increase in the low marginal cost capacity lead to a 
lower marginal cost for any given quantity which encourages the social planner 
to use more gas generation. 
 
Also, when the gas generation capacity is low the generation capacity constraint 
might actually become binding in certain periods when there is not enough 
water available.  For example, in our small capacity case where we cut 60% off 
the gas generation capacity from the standard calibration, we observe that in 
some periods for example towards the end of the 4th year and in the mid of year 
19, the gas generation reaches its maximum capacity. Increasing gas generation 
capacity from low to medium does not only reduce the marginal cost for each 
given quantity but also allows more generation in periods with low hydro 
resources by relaxing the capacity constraint. That is why we observe a bigger 
increase in the gas generation level when we move from the small capacity to the 
standard capacity. By moving from the standard capacity to the big capacity 
while we still observe an increase in the gas generation but the difference is not 
as big as if we are moving from a small capacity to a standard one. This is 
because in both the standard case and the big capacity case the capacity is big 
enough for the social planner to choose the generation quantity without being 
constrained: the increase in average gas generation is a result of the cheaper 
marginal cost, not from relaxing the capacity constraint. 
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Diagram 6-2: Gas generation given the low capacity of the gas plant 
 
 
 
Diagram 6-3: The gas generation level given for the standard gas generation 
capacity (left) and the big gas generation capacity (right). 
 
 
While the gas generation level increases significantly with increases in the gas 
generation capacity, we do not observe a significant change in the hydro 
generation level and in the lake level.  
 
Although the storage level and the hydro generation level remain unchanged, 
the shadow price of water changes quite significantly as the gas generation 
capacity changes . We observe that the shadow price of water is higher when the 
gas generation capacity is small and the shadow price is lower when the gas 
generation capacity is big. One way to understand this result is that we can think 
of having a small gas generation capacity as an outage of low marginal cost gas 
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plant or a positive shift in demand – when there is an outage in the supply of the 
gas generated electricity or when there is a positive shift in demand the hydro 
resource becomes more important which leads to an increase in the shadow 
price of water. The other way to think about it is that the shadow price of water 
which measures the value of the hydro resource also reflects the marginal cost of 
its substitute. As we reduce the maximum level of gas generation capacity we 
also make the marginal cost for any given quantity becomes more expensive. 
Therefore up-scaling in the marginal cost of gas generation lead to an up-scale in 
the shadow price of water.  
 
As a result of the changes in the gas generation level, the marginal cost of gas 
generation and the shadow price of water given the variation in the gas 
generation capacity, we observe some significant differences in the competitive 
equilibrium prices under the three cases. Similar to the shadow price of water, 
the price to consumer is higher when the gas generation capacity is small and 
decreases as we increase the capacity.  
 
Given the results we have seen so far, an outage in the low marginal cost gas 
generation plant generally leads to a lower quantity of electricity generated 
(which is mainly due to the decrease in the amount of gas generation) and an 
increase in the competitive per unit price of electricity in the market. These two 
effects collectively lead to a decrease in the net social benefit in society. We 
found that the net social benefit increases as the gas generation capacity 
increases, but at a decreasing rate. Outage in the gas generation capacity or 
positive demand shock in general lead to decrease in welfare and this effect is 
particularly significant when the generation capacity is already low. 
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6.2.2 Water inflow process 
 
In our model we assumed that nature generates water inflow ty  at each time t 
according to the following square-root process: 
ttttt dydydy   )(  
With   measuring the rate of mean reversion,  measures the long term mean 
and  measures the volatility of the inflow process. 
 
After fitting the square root model to monthly water inflow data from a 
centralised dataset issued by the New Zealand Electricity Commission, we 
obtained estimates for the parameters of the inflow process: 
ttttt dydydy 9056.0)1(9448.6   
As a result, for the standard competitive model we set the rate of mean reversion 
  equal to 6.9448, the long term mean   equals 1 and the volatility measure 
equals 0.9056. 
 
In this section we conduct comparative analysis to study how the market 
outcomes change as a result of changes in two inputs for the water inflow 
process – the mean and the rate of mean reversion. For each of the two 
parameters we will generate the outcomes in the competitive market using the 
value of the parameter plus and minus 30% of its value used in the standard case, 
while keeping the other two parameters equal to the original levels. By 
comparing these newly generated results with the ones we obtained in the 
standard model, we hope to understand the impact these inputs have on the 
market outcomes in the competitive market. 
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6.2.2 – 1 Mean of water inflow process ( ) 
 
First, we compare the market outcomes generated in the markets with different 
long term means of the water inflow process, more specifically when   equals 
0.7, 1 and 1.3.  
 
Diagram 6-4: Simulated water inflow given different values of the mean 
 
Diagram 6-4 demonstrates what the simulated inflow processes look like with 
different values of  . The blue line represents the simulated daily inflow with 
  equal to 0.7; the purple line represents the simulated inflow given that   
equals 1 (which is the value used in the standard model); and the yellow line 
represents the simulated inflow given that   equals 1.3. This diagram shows 
that changes in the long term mean   while keeping the rate of mean-reversion 
and volatility measures constant, do not change the movement in the inflow 
process, instead it shifts the entire inflow process up or down. In order to 
compare results from different inflow series, we retain the simulated draws. 
That is the higher the  , the more inflow there is in each given period. 
 
The following table summarizes the market outcomes in a competitive market 
given three different values for the long term mean  . 
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Table 6-2: market outcomes at different average inflows23 
Quantity 30% higher   30% lower   
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Inflow (  ) 1.3 0.277053 0.7 0.203301 
Storage (  ) 1.0777004 1.0360469 0.850906151 0.926704847 
Price (  ) 0.80048876 1.09634339 1.200664846 0.81685778 
Hydro generation 
(  ) 
1.30015786 1.09634556 0.698098267 0.816857025 
Gas generation 
(  ) 
0.78152583 1.09634483 1.219745227 0.816858337 
Shadow price of 
water (  ) 
0.0533676 1.17400973 1.24134206 0.800082344 
Net social benefit 
(NSB) 
1.0630729 0.8572319 0.91934944 1.044112542 
 
We observe that as the long term mean of the inflow   increases, the lake level 
increases. This is because higher   implies more inflow in all periods. With 
more water in each given period the social planner will choose to increase the 
amount of water to be stored accordingly. However, the magnitude of changes 
in the lake level is small in periods when the inflows are low or when the lake is 
already full and bigger in periods when the inflows are high. This is because 
given an increase in the hydro inflow mean, the changes in the inflow level 
given an increase in the mean are positively correlated with the fluctuations in 
the inflow itself. That is, the increase in inflow is bigger when the inflow is high 
and smaller when the inflow is small, which causes the storage level to increase 
significantly during these wet periods relative to the drought periods. We also 
observe that for those periods where the lake is full in the standard model where 
  equals 1, decreasing   leads to a decrease in the lake level while increasing 
                                                 
23
 Data except inflows are relative to the standard calibration.  
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  does not increase the storage level any further due to the fact that the lake has 
already reached its maximum capacity. 
 
An increase in the mean of the inflow process   increases the amount of water 
available to the social planner in each given period, in both the direct way 
though the higher inflow in each period and the indirect way though the higher 
amount of water in the lake stored in the past. As the water becomes less scarce, 
an increase in   leads to a decrease in the shadow price of water in that market. 
This decrease lowers the opportunity cost of water which encourages the social 
planner to use more hydro in electricity generation. That is why we observe a 
significant increase in the amount of hydro generation chosen by the social 
planner given the increases in  . On the other hand, the gas generation becomes 
relatively more expensive to hydro generation as the mean of inflow increases. 
Therefore we observe decreases in the amount of gas generation as the inflow 
mean increases. 
 
Overall increases in the mean of the inflow significantly increase the total 
quantity of electricity at equilibrium and significantly decrease the overall price 
in the market. Moreover it brings a higher welfare to the society as it allows the 
social planner to use more hydro in generation in each period at lower cost and 
with more water in the storage. However, it is worthwhile to note that the 
increase in the net social benefit is less significant in periods when the lake is 
close to being empty or full – that is when the lake’s ability to smooth the hydro 
generation is limited. 
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Diagram 6-5: Comparison between the market outcomes generated in a 
competitive market given three inflows with different mean (Blue for the case 
with low mean, purple for the case with the standard mean and yellow for the 
case with high mean): 
 
Storage                                                         Shadow price of water 
 
 
Hydro generation                                        Gas generation 
 
 
Price                                                           Net social benefit 
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6.2.2 - 2 Mean reversion rate of water inflow process ( ) 
 
Now we compare the market outcomes generated in the competitive market 
given three different simulated water inflow using different values for the rate of 
mean-reversion, more specifically for values of   equal to the value estimated 
using the New Zealand inflow data, and when it equals plus and minus 30% of 
the standard value. 
 
Diagram 6-6: Simulated water inflow given different values of the mean 
reversion rate. 
 
The mean reversion rate measures the rate by which the shocks dissipate and the 
variable reverts towards the mean. By comparing the three simulated inflow 
using different values of the mean reversion rate in diagram 6-6, we can see for 
any given random shock that diverts the inflow away from its mean it takes less 
time for the simulated inflow with high   to adjust back toward its mean, 
relative to the one simulated using lower values for  . As a result of the inflows 
simulated using the higher mean reversion rate are more stable over time and 
the fluctuations in the process are smaller, so that the inflow is closer to the 
mean. 
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We then run the competitive model on each of the three simulated series of 
inflow and generated the market outcomes at equilibrium under each scenario. 
Table 6-6 below summarizes the results. 
 
Table 6-3: market outcomes at different inflow mean reversion24 
Quantity 30% higher   30% lower   
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Inflow (  ) 1 0.213 1 0.290 
Storage (  ) 
0.95999959 
 
0.9287856 
 
1.024651556 
 
1.098332582 
 
Price (  ) 
0.99774949 
 
0.75653164 
 
1.004354997 
 
1.388122276 
 
Hydro generation 
(  ) 
1.0033823 
 
0.75653304 
 
0.993445272 
 
1.388126892 
 
Gas generation 
(  ) 
0.99753817 
 
1 
 
1.004771137 
 
1.388125365 
 
Shadow price of 
water (  ) 
0.99811552 
 
0.74554341 
 
1.003206105 
 
1.423641826 
 
Net social benefit 
(NSB) 
1.00161306 
 
0.77259357 
 
0.9966858 
 
1.372609354 
 
 
Having a higher mean reversion rate smoothes the fluctuations in the inflow 
process over time and it reduces the unconditional variance of inflow. Therefore 
it is not surprising to see that the impact of a higher mean reversion rate is very 
similar to that we have seen just before when we used a lower standard 
deviation measure of the inflow process. On average the market with inflow that 
has a higher mean reversion has a lower lake level in each period and a lower 
shadow price of water; the lower shadow price of water encourages the social 
planner to use more hydro in each period on average and decreases the amount 
of gas generation which overall leads to a lower price in the market and results a 
higher welfare for society. 
                                                 
24
 Data except inflows are relative to the standard calibration.  
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Diagram 6-7: Comparison between the market outcomes generated in a 
competitive market given three inflows with different mean reversion rates 
(Yellow for the case with low mean reversion rate, purple for the case with the 
mean reversion rate used in the standard case and blue for the case with high 
mean reversion rate): 
 
 
Storage                                                         Shadow price of water 
 
 
Hydro generation                                       Gas generation 
 
 
Price                                                           Net social benefit 
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Section 7: Methods for assessing the exercise of market power in 
electricity markets 
 
In this section, we analyze and evaluate the methods for assessing the exercise of 
market power in electricity markets.  Section 7.1 presents a literature review on 
the methods that have been used to assess the exercise of market power in the 
past. In section 7.2 we will discuss the approaches that can be used to assess the 
existence of market power abuse in the New Zealand market. Finally in section 
7.3 we will use the market outcomes generated in our simulation to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the market power test in the New Zealand market. 
 
7.1 Literature review on the methods for assessing the exercise of market 
power in electricity markets 
 
There are many factors that affect the level of market power abuse in a particular 
market, these includes: number of participants, relative size of each supplier, 
elasticity of demand where there are many, and no dominant, demanders, 
barriers to entry, the amount and distribution of excess capacity, transaction 
costs of trade and factors such as strategic and environmental uncertainty.25  
 
Studies of electricity markets have generally assumed that there are many price-
taking demanders, and that strategic and environmental uncertainties can be 
neglected. 26 
 
  
                                                 
25
 Strategic uncertainty arises when there is uncertainty about the behaviour of other market participants. 
Environmental uncertainty is the uncertainty that is due to nature: for example in electricity markets this 
would include uncertainty about the gas price and lake inflows. 
26
 See Evans and Guthrie (2009) for analysis of the effect of fuel availability and price on electricity 
production decisions. 
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7.1.1  Concentration measure 
 
Abuse of market power is a problem inherently related to the structure of a 
market. In a monopoly market, the monopolist has absolute market power 
because he is the only supplier in the market and therefore determines the 
market price and quantity. However, in a market where there is a large number 
of small firms, each firm’s behaviour will have only small, if any, effects on the 
market equilibrium price and quantity. Therefore the potential of market power 
abuse in a particular market is positively correlated to the concentration in that 
market.  
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the most widely used index for structural 
assessment of a market. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market 
shares of the 50 largest firms (or summed over all the firms if there are fewer 
than 50 firms) in the industry. The market share is measured in percentage value. 
 
                                                                                                     [40] 
 
The HHI approaches 0 when there are a large amount of small suppliers in the 
market (perfectly competitive) and it equals 10000 when the market is pure 
monopoly. 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is easy to calculate and it provides information 
about the concentration in this market. Additionally, HHI takes account of the 
relative size of all suppliers in the market, and proportionally gives greater 
weights to bigger firms. 
 
This HHI is adopted by some US regulatory agencies such as the Federal Energy 
Regulation Commission (FERC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in United 

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States as a screening test in determining whether an electricity supplier is likely 
to have market power.  This is because all else equal the potential for market 
power in a market is correlated with its market concentration. When the market 
is heavily concentrated, a lack of competition will make it easier for the firms in 
such a market to exercise market power. Markets with HHI values between 1000 
and 1800 are considered to be moderately concentrated, and those with HHI 
exceeding 1800 are considered to be concentrated. Under the horizontal Merger 
Guideline issued by DOJ in United States, in the case when a single transaction 
leads to a 100 points increase in HHI in a concentrated market, an antitrust 
concern is raised.  
 
However, this approach is generally not used as a direct measure of market 
power in electricity markets. This is because the index does not take into account 
other factors that play important roles in determining the level of market power 
abuse, such as the elasticity of demand, the competitive cost of generation, 
barriers of entry, capacity constraints etc. Borenstein (1999) showed that the HHI 
does a poor job of measuring the amount of market power in electricity markets, 
due to the fact that the electricity generation industry is characterized by price-
inelastic demand, significant short-run capacity constraints and extremely costly 
storage. Under such circumstance, even when the overall market HHI measure 
is low, firms with small market shares can still excise market power. 
 
7.1.2 Lerner Index 
 
Another approach that is commonly used in measuring the abuse of market 
power uses the Lernex index. It has the following form: 
 
                                    
    
 
                                         [41] 
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where   represents actual market price and  marginal cost. The Lerner index 
quantifies the extent to which that supplier is able to raise the price above its 
marginal costs of supplying the last unit of a good before reaching equilibrium. 
Under perfect competition where the firms have no market power, in 
equilibrium they will set their price equal to the marginal cost, therefore yield a 
Lerner index of 0. A positive Lerner index suggests supplier’s ability to charge a 
price above their marginal cost and as their market power increases, the index 
increases.  
 
The Lerner index can also be represented as the negative inverse of price 
elasticity of demand evaluated at the market-clearing price. In contrast to the 
HHI measure, the Lerner index therefore does take into account consumer’s 
responsiveness toward a change in price (that is, the price elasticity of demand). 
 
There are a number of regulatory agencies that adopt this approach. The DOJ of 
USA sets the threshold at 5% such that a firm will be considered abusing market 
power if P exceeds MC by more than 5%. However, the difficulty in the 
implementation of the Lerner index is that it is very difficult to determine 
marginal cost since the supplier production cost information is generally 
confidential and marginal cost must be estimated. A second major difficulty 
with the Lerner condition is that price equals marginal cost is efficient – thereby 
suggesting pricing without market power – only when marginal cost is long run 
marginal cost.27 In the short-run, price greater than marginal cost is required to 
meet any fixed costs if the firms are to be viable. In industries, such as the 
electricity industry, with large irreversible investments price greater than short-
run marginal cost will occur even when the industry is very competitive.  
 
                                                 
27
 Long run marginal cost being the cost of expanding firm capacity by one unit and producing at 
the new capacity. 
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Although an accurate measure of marginal cost for electricity production is hard 
to calculate, in the past 20 years there has been a number of empirical studies 
that have developed approaches to modelling the marginal cost function. Three 
popular approaches will be summarized in the following section. They are: 
 
(1) Simulation analysis at market level: Borenstein et al (2002) 
(2) Cournot Equilibrium simulation approach: Bushnell and Borenstein (1998) 
(3) Estimating marginal cost function using observed bid data: Wolak (2003a) 
 
7.1.2.1 Simulation analysis 
 
One popular approach in assessing the actual abuse of market power in 
electricity markets is called simulation analysis. This approach attempts to 
simulate a market level marginal cost curve of generation as if all the generators 
are working in a hypothetical competitive market. By using information 
collected on the technical characteristics of the existing generation plants present 
in the market, the market marginal cost curve for that trading period is 
constructed by stacking generators from least expensive to most expensive.  
 
Diagram 7-1: Demand and supply in the electricity market 
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Given the market clearing quantity, the corresponding cost on the simulated 
market marginal cost curve gives the competitive benchmark price.  The mark-
up in this market for this time period is calculated by comparing the competitive 
benchmark price with the observed market-clearing price. The extent to which 
the latter price is in excess of the competitive cost (the mark-up) gives an 
indication of the amount of market power being exercised in this market.  
 
This approach was initially developed by Wolfram (1999) in her study of the 
British electricity spot market.  The same approach has been applied in the 
California market in a number of studies: Borenstein et al (2002) applied this 
approach in measuring the market inefficiencies in the California electricity spot 
market using confidential data on costs from CAISO for the period from June 
1998 to October 2000; Joskow and Kahn (2002) conduct the same analysis but 
relying on data which is generally available to the public. Other studies include 
Wolak, Nordhaus and Shapiro(2000) and Hildebrandt(2000). 
 
In Borenstein et al 2002 (BBW(2002)), simulation analysis was applied to analyze 
market inefficiency in the California electricity spot market using data from 
CAISO for the period June 1998 to October 2000. However, the California market 
is more complicated than others as quantity supplied in California wholesale 
market consists of not only the amount generated by the in-state generators but 
also the amount that is generated by generators outside California.  BBW(2002) 
deal with this problem by taking the imports away from the total demand 
function to obtain the residual demand of in-state generation while simulating 
the marginal cost curve for in-state generation. Competitive price benchmark 
price is calculated by finding the intersection of the in-state residual demand 
curve, net of imports, and the simulated marginal cost curve. 
 
97 
 
BBW estimated the residual market demand to be met by in-state fossil-fuel 
units    
  in the following way: 
                            
      
      
     
      
       
       
                  [42] 
                   
where     
  is the observed ISO generation including output generated by all 
generation units and imports. The quantity     
  represents the addition to 
demand due to the need for capacity dedicated to regulation reserve.    
  and 
    
   are the amount of energy generated by must-take generation and by 
reservoir generation.  The must-take units are the units that always operate 
under a regulatory side agreement, for example nuclear generation. The 
reservoir generation include hydro generation and geothermal generation. 
Instead of subtracting away the observed amount of import     
  , an adjustment 
term      
  is also taken away from the total output. This adjustment term is to 
capture the responsiveness of imports to price. Notice that if generators outside 
the California market were perfectly competitive, then their marginal cost of 
producing the very last unit of      
  would equal the market clearing price in the 
overall California market and this price would be a cap on the price in that 
market. For the in-state generators to effectively exercise market power (that is, 
to push the market price above the competitive level), they must withdraw their 
own generation and substitute it with more expensive imports.  Therefore when 
the price is higher than the competitive level the observed imports will be higher 
than the level obtained when price is lower than the competitive level. In BBW, 
data on the outside suppliers’ adjustment bid is used to adjust imports to the 
California price. 
 
For this reason, though the aggregate demand faced by the entire market is 
inelastic, after adding back the capacity dedicated to regulation reserve, and 
taking away the quantity generated by other in-state non-fossil-fuel generations 
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and the adjusted net imports that reflect its competitive responsiveness to price, 
the residual demand faced by in-state fossil-fuel generators becomes elastic to 
the extent that imports are elastically supplied. 
 
To estimate the market level marginal cost of production for all in-state 
generators, they divide the total generation into three categories: reservoir 
(hydro, geothermal), must-take and fossil-fuel generation. The must-take units 
are the units that always operate under a regulatory side agreement, for example 
the nuclear generation. BBW(2002) also assumed that the actual observed output 
of reservoir resources is the output that would be produced by a price taking 
firm participating in a perfectly competitive market. It relies on CAISO 
settlement data for the hourly output of must-take generation, geothermal and 
hydro production at the market-clearing point.  The residual demand of in-state 
generation beyond the sum of the output produced by these two generation 
categories above will be served by using the fossil-fuel generation. In sum, 
BBW(2002) calculate the marginal cost of satisfying the remaining demand with 
the state’s fossil-fuel resources, where fossil fuel generators face responsiveness 
in demand cause by price sensitive out of state supplies. 
 
For fossil-fuel generators, the marginal cost is estimated using the fuel costs and 
heat rate of each generating unit and the variable operating and maintenance 
cost of each unit. The cost of NOx emission credit is also taken into account.  
BBW also used Monte Carlo simulation to model the unplanned outage of each 
generating unit.  For each hour, they make 100 fossil-fuel-generation marginal 
cost curve estimates, each reflecting a combination of independent Monte Carlo 
draws for the forced outages of each generation unit from the outage 
distribution.   
 
Given the 100 simulated marginal cost curves for the in-state fossil-fuel 
generation in hourly trading periods, and the residual demand faced by those 
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generators after taking away the quantity generated by the other two classes of 
in-state generators and imports, they find the intersection of the residual market 
demand curve with each one of the 100 simulated marginal cost curves.  An 
estimate of the competitive benchmark price in that hour that assumes price-
taking behaviour is calculated by taking the average of the demand intersections 
with the 100 estimated marginal costs.  
 
By comparing this estimated competitive benchmark price with the observed 
market clearing price, Borenstein(2002) found that from June 1998 to October 
2000, the observed market clearing price in the California electricity market 
significantly departed from competitive pricing during high demand periods.  
 
It is very difficult to measure the variable per unit cost of electricity generation. 
However, in many electricity markets, before the structural reform in the 1990s, 
the entire market demand was served by one state-owned generator. Due its 
history of regulation, data existed on the hourly output for all generating units, 
transmission power flows and some technical characteristics of each generation 
plants, for example the fuel cost, efficiency rate of generation, capacity 
constraints etc. Given the availability of those data, the estimation of generating 
unit-level variable costs can be done quite accurately.  This is the case for many 
countries (for example, United Kingdom, United States), but not for New 
Zealand.  
 
However, there are a few shortcomings of this approach. One big weakness is 
that a lot of major simplifications must be made in order to simulate the market 
competitive supply curve. One example of these simplifications is that 
BBW(2002) assumed that there is no transmission congestion constraint, no 
transmission losses and zero transmission cost. Ignoring these constraints and 
costs, may cause underestimation of the marginal cost. By doing this, they 
generally do not incorporate the start up costs or the minimum load effects. 
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Working in a static setting causes problems in estimating the marginal costs in 
hydroelectric generation. For example in BBW, they assumed that hydro 
generators are competing competitively and they use the observed production of 
hydro resources for each hour (which is exogenous) to represents the amount 
that will be generated by the hydro generators in that period. They did not take 
into account the dynamic features of hydro generators’ behaviour. This is 
because in a dynamic setting, the marginal cost of water is not just the direct cost 
of turning water into electricity; it should also reflect the opportunity cost of 
storing hydro energy and using it at some later time. Therefore modelling the 
hydro generation in a static setting may cause an under-estimation of its 
marginal cost. The same issues apply to gas-fired generation (see Evans and 
Guthrie (2009)). It means that the model of BBW does not include decision 
making in the market that recognises environmental uncertainties of that market. 
 
However, the approach used in BBW could be modified to estimate the market 
competitive benchmark price of a market with hydro as long as the import only 
accounts for a very small proportion of total energy generation, and there was 
no volatility in the gas price or availability. BBW, because it had limited 
information on the marginal cost of imports could not accurately simulate a 
marginal cost curve that accounts for both fossil-fuel generation and imports. 
Instead they subtract the quantity supplied by the out-of-state generators from 
aggregate demand using the bidding information on imports, to produce an 
estimate of the residual demand faced by the in-state generators. It then 
calculates the competitive price by finding the intersection between this residual 
demand curve and the simulated marginal cost curve of in-state fossil 
generations (this is the part where they have more accurate information on the 
costs and efficiency rates). For a country with significant hydro generation and 
fossil-fuel generation, the BBW approach is problematic because the behaviour 
of hydro generators matters and it is impossible to calculate the marginal cost of 
hydro in a static setting. This is a consequence of the fact that the hydro marginal 
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cost reflects the option value of water and this option value cannot be calculated 
in a static model since it requires assessment of the value of future generation. In 
a closed economy, with sufficient information on the bid/offer for the 
hydroelectric energy, then the way BBW treat the import can be adopted here to 
adjust for the hydro generation: that is the marginal cost of gas-fired generators 
can be compared to demand for their generation where the demand depends 
upon the amount and price responsiveness of hydro generation. However, 
feasibility of adopting this approach depends on the availability of those 
bid/offer information and whether there is adequate gas-fired capacity and no 
gas price or availability issue. It is likely to work well if hydro generation only 
accounts for a small percentage in the total market generation and there are no 
gas, NOx, storage constraints or frictions. 
 
7.1.2.2  Cournot Simulation method 
 
The Cournot28 simulation method is similar to the simulation analysis above in 
that  both construct the marginal cost curve for a trading period by stacking 
generators/generation units from least to most expensive. The difference 
between the two is that, in the simulation analysis of BBW the market as a whole 
is considered ignoring the strategic behaviour of generators within the market, 
whereas in the Cournot simulation method it is assumed that the generators 
within an oligopoly market compete with each other under Cournot competition. 
That is each generator will choose the quantity of generation by acting as a 
monopolist on their residual demand curves, holding fixed the quantities other 
competitors are generating. 
 
The Cournot Equilibrium analysis was first developed by Klemperer and Meyer 
(1989). Since then this approach has been frequently applied in analyzing market 
                                                 
28 Recherches (1838) 
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power in the UK electricity market and markets elsewhere. For example, Bolle 
(1992), Green and Newbery (1992) and Green (1996) used this approach to model 
the UK electricity market. The reasons for its popularity are first that the 
majority of electricity markets worldwide have an oligopoly structure; and 
second, the model explicitly models the strategic behaviour of interacting 
suppliers, but in a particular way.  
 
In 1998, Borenstein and Bushnell applied it to analyze the potential for market 
power in California’s electricity industry. The algorithm of the Cournot 
simulation method used in Borenstein and Bushnell (1998) is as follows: 
 
 First, simulate the marginal cost functions for each generator that they 
assume acts as a Cournot competitor as for the BBW approach, but for 
each generator they simulate its marginal cost curve by stacking the 
generation units owned by this firm from least expensive to most 
expensive. They use the observed data on must-take generation and 
hydro generation to calculate the amount of non-fossil-fuel generation 
that they are willing to supply. It is assumed that the remaining demand 
is satisfied by using the state’s fossil-fuel resources. They construct the 
marginal cost functions of fossil-fuel generation for each Cournot 
generator using the plant heat-rate and operating cost data obtained from 
the California Energy Commission and other sources. 
 
 Using the same approach as BBW, Bushnell and Borenstein assume that 
quantities produced by the out-state generators are priced at a 
competitive price. Therefore the residual demand curve that is faced by 
all Cournot fossil-fuel generators in the market equals the market 
aggregate demand minus the amounts of must-take generation, hydro 
and competitive imports. Further, each generator (Cournot player) in the 
market faces its residual demand function that is the aggregate demand 
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faced by all in-state fossil-fuel generators minus the quantities being 
produced by all the other in-state generators.  
 
Using the marginal cost functions of Cournot competitors and their residual 
demand functions, BB used a grid-search method to calculate the Cournot 
equilibrium iteratively. The first Cournot player sets output competitively using 
its simulated marginal cost function while assuming that the other players have 
no outputs. The second firm sets its output competitively under the assumption 
that the first firm will maintain the output at the level that was calculated in the 
previous iteration, and the output from all the other players remain as zero. 
Then the third firm, taking the quantities calculated in the previous two 
calculations as given, sets the output monopolistically given the residual 
demand it faces, and so on. The process repeats, returning to each supplier with 
each re-setting their output monopolistically using the most recent output 
decision of the others, until the output levels do not change with iterations. The 
price at that supply-equilibrium corresponds to the benchmark price in a 
competitive oligopoly market where all players play one-shot Cournot. 
 
The treatment Bushnell and Borenstein (1998) used in calculating the hydro 
generated (demand) quantity is different from the approach adopted in BBW. 
Instead of using the observed quantity of hydro generation, they use a technique 
known as ‚peak-shaving‛ to approximate a Cournot competitor’s optimal 
allocation of hydroelectric energy. That is, they allocate the available 
hydroelectric production in a month across hours of the month by allocating 
hydro to the highest demand periods subject to minimum and maximum flow 
constraints. The reason for doing this is to capture the property that hydro 
generation has the ability to allocate its resources over time. The producers 
would always want to move hydro output to the time period in which the 
marginal revenue was the highest. Since marginal revenue is not observable, 
they instead allocate the hydro output to the time period when the demand is 
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the highest. If demand perfectly correlates with the marginal revenue then this 
allocation reflects suppliers’ optimal behaviour for hydro allocation. However, if 
demand is imperfectly correlated with the marginal revenue, the approach could 
overstate or understate of the exercise of market power.  
 
7.1.2.3 Estimating marginal cost function using observed bids: Wolak(2001) 
 
Rosse (1970) estimated the underlying marginal cost of monopolists by using a 
sample of monopoly local newspapers and the assumption of profit 
maximization. After that, similar research has been done by empirical industrial 
organization economists that devise estimation procedures to recover cost 
functions from data on market-clearing prices and quantities.   
 
The basic idea of all these techniques is as followed: 
 
Let            denote the inverse demand function facing a monopolist, and let 
           be its total cost function.   represents the quantity, and   are the 
demand and supply shifters respectively.   is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and      represents the stochastic shocks that are not observed.  
 
For the monopolist, its profit function is 
                                                                        [43] 
 
When the profit is maximized, the following condition has to hold: 
                                                                              [44] 
That is at equilibrium, quantity     , such that 
 
                                                                    [45] 
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Suppose that the inverse demand faced by the monopolist takes the form of 
                     , where       are the elements of vector  , then 
the profit maximization condition becomes equivalent to the following:  
 
                                                                   [46] 
 
The econometrician can use the instrumental variable technique to estimate the 
value of a, b and c. Given the estimated values for these parameters, together 
with the market-clearing prices and quantities, the econometrician can solve for 
the value of marginal cost             . 
 
Once an estimate of marginal cost is obtained, it is substituted into the formula 
of the Lerner Index to get an estimate of the amount of market power possessed 
by this firm. 
 
Wolak (2001) adopted this concept in his paper, extended it and presented 
several techniques to estimate the underlying marginal cost function in a bid-
based electricity market using data on bids and market clearing prices and 
quantities from that market.  
This approach is not very useful to our analysis, because the model will not give 
us any information on bids submitted by the generators in each period. 
 
However, Wolak(2003) uses yet another approach. It measures the market power 
at firm-level for each of the five largest electricity suppliers in California in the 
state’s real-time market for the period from 1 June to 20 September of 1998, 1999 
and 2000. In this paper, Wolak measures the level of market power abuse for 
firm j in hour h by evaluating the value of the Lerner index at the market-
clearing prices and quantities. Instead of taking the ratio between mark-up and 
market price, Wolak calculates this index by equating it to the price elasticity of 
demand evaluated at market price for firm j. Wolak demonstrates in the first half 
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of the paper that when a firm is bidding according to its expected profit 
maximizing bid curve S(p) where S(p) is the function passing through all of the 
ex-post profit maximizing price and quantity pairs associated with all possible 
residual demand curve realizations, the ratio of the mark-up (P-MC) to market 
clearing price equals the negative inverse of the price elasticity of demand 
evaluated at this market clearing price.  That is the following equation holds for 
each hour of the day h, and each supplier j: 
 
                                                    
       
  
                                         [47] 
 
where    stands for the market clearing price at hour h;     is the marginal cost 
of producing the last unit before reaching market clearing quantity for firm j in 
hour h, and      is the price elasticity of firm j’s residual demand evaluated at 
equilibrium.  
 
Wolak(2003) argues that in the CAISO real-time market, due to the flexibility in 
how the bid curves of a market participant can vary across hours of the day, 
generally the bids submitted by generators would not deviate much from their 
optimal bidding function that satisfies equation [47].   
 
Given that this condition holds, the Lerner index is calculated in the following 
steps: first, computes the aggregate demand for electricity in the CAISO’s real-
time market. Second construct the aggregate demand function by ranking 
consumer’s demand bid up from the highest bid to the lowest. Thirdly, derive 
firm j’s residual demand by subtracting the total amount supplied at this price 
by all market participants other than firm j given their optimal bidding function. 
Fourthly, compute the slope of firm j’s residual demand at market clearing price 
by using a first difference approximation.  That is, find the closest price above 
   such that the residual demand is less than the value at    , call it        ; then 
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find the closest price below    such that the residual demand is higher than 
value   , call it         . Finally approximate the price elasticity of residual 
demand of firm j in hour h by the slope of the line that passes through those two 
points. That is     can be computed as 
 
    
                            
                 
 
                
                             
 
                                                                                                                                       [48] 
Using this approach, Wolak(2003) calculates an approximate value for the 
hourly price elasticity of residual demand for each firm evaluated at its market 
clearing price in that hour, then takes the negative inverse to find out the value 
of  the Lerner index for that firm in that hour. Wolak(2003) then takes the 
average Lerner index across time. The average hourly value of      for each 
supplier for the period from 1 June to 30 September gives an annual measure of 
the amount of unilateral market power possessed by firm j. 
 
Using this approach, Wolak (2003) found that the average hourly Lerner indexes 
are significantly higher in 2000 relative to 1998 and 1999, for all firms in the 
California real-time electricity market. Wolak(2003) concludes that all firms 
exercised more market power in 2000 compared to the prior 2 years. The means 
for the hourly Lerner index for the months in 1998 are statistically significantly 
greater than the means for 1999.  However, within a particular year, the Lerner 
index for one firm is not statistically different from the Lerner index of the other 
and this statement holds true for all three years. 
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7.2 Approaches to measure market power in the New Zealand Electricity 
Market 
 
In the following section, I will discuss the approaches that can be used to assess 
the performance of market power tests in the New Zealand electricity market. 
 
The model presented in this paper improves the literature that models the 
amount of hydro electricity generation in a static setting as it takes into account 
the option value of water (which arises from a generator’s ability to allocate 
hydro resources efficiently across time) and solves for the equilibrium in a 
dynamic setting. Given a simulated series of water inflow ty  that is generated 
using Monte Carlo simulation, for time t where t goes from 0 to n, we have the 
following information: 
 
   Competitive Market Monopoly 
Market clearing prices ctP  mtP  
Hydro generation ctZ  mtZ  
Gas generation ctM  mtM  
Storage lake level ctS  mtS  
Shadow price of water 
ct
sW  
ct
sW  
 
At the end of each trading day, the public can observe the market clearing price 
tP , the amount of hydro generation tZ  and the amount of gas generation tM . 
This information is generally publicly available through the Electricity 
Commission.  The commission also has some data available on the storage lake 
level    . The marginal cost of certain generation plants, for example the gas 
plant, is likely to be estimated using historical data (for example, in New 
Zealand, the Ministry of Economic Development has some data on the marginal 
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cost of different types of electricity generation plants), similarly for the 
transmission costs. However, the data on the shadow price of water     are 
generally not publicly available.  
 
To conduct the assessment on the performance of market power tests in the New 
Zealand electricity market, I run a chosen market power test over the results 
given by the simulations. The party that runs the market power test can only use 
the data that are publicly available, in our case the market clearing prices and 
quantities. The chosen market power test is effective if it can distinguish the data 
generated in a competitive market setting from the data generated in the case 
assuming the market is monopolistic.  
 
The market power test that is described in Wolak (2003b) which estimates  a 
firm’s price elasticity of residual demand at the market clearing price cannot be 
applied to our model. This is because we do not have any information on 
consumer’s demand bids and on offer bids submitted by the generators. Without 
this information, it is impossible to construct firms’ residual demand in which 
the price elasticity of demand can be calculated from. Similarly, the method 
described by Wolak (2003a) cannot be used on the data that we have as this 
method also requires information on generators’ bids which we lack.  
 
The market power test that we adopt in this paper is a simplified version of the 
one that is described in BBW. The essence of their approach is to simulate the 
marginal cost curve for the fossil-fuel generator, then compare the observed 
market clearing price for the overall market with the marginal cost of fossil-fuel 
generation at its quantity produced. However, the market power test that we use 
here is much simpler than the one that is described in their paper. This is 
because in our model there are only two types of generation plants, the hydro 
plant and the gas plant. The overall market demand is entirely served by those 
two plants without any imports. Therefore there is no need for us to adjust for 
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quantities produced by the must-take generations (nuclear) and for the imports 
in the way that is done in BBW(2002). 
 
Assume that the party that runs the market power test can get access to data that 
enable them to obtain a close estimate on the cost of gas generation      and the 
transaction costs (     ). Using those data they are able to simulate the marginal 
cost curve for the gas plant. For each given quantity of gas generation m, the 
marginal cost of gas generated electricity at this quantity equals the marginal 
cost of producing this unit of electricity using gas plant ( )(mC ) plus the cost of 
transmitting it to the end-user (k2). At the market clearing price, the quantity of 
demand faced by the gas generator equals the equilibrium quantity of gas 
generation, which also equals the total market clearing quantity minus the 
amount of hydro generation. We can use the simulated marginal cost curve for 
gas generation to find out the marginal cost of gas generation at the observed 
quantity of gas generation. The difference between the marginal cost and the 
observed market-clearing price gives us some indication of the amount of 
market power being exercised in this market.  
 
We can run this test on the data generated in the competitive market setting and 
also on the data generated assuming the market is monopolistic, and then 
compare the gap between price and marginal cost in one case with the other. If 
the gap calculated in the monopolistic market is significantly bigger than the gap 
calculated in the competitive market, it suggests that this market power test can 
effectively distinguish between the market outcomes from a competitive market 
and from a monopolistic market.  
 
This approach has been widely used in detecting the existence of market power 
abuse in many electricity markets. However, it only works under the assumption 
that the gas generation always serves as the marginal generator. Problems occur 
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when the gas generation is no longer the marginal generator, for example if 
there is an upper bound on the gas generation capacity and the market clearing 
quantity is higher than this upper limit. This is because if this scenario occurs, 
the marginal cost of gas generation at the equilibrium quantity of gas generated 
electricity, which equals its maximum capacity, fails to represent the overall 
marginal cost of generation at the market clearing quantity. The overall marginal 
cost equals the cost of producing the last unit of electricity, which is generated 
using hydro. In that case using the marginal cost of gas generation as an estimate 
of the overall marginal cost would cause downwards bias.  
 
In this section, we are interested in investigating the effectiveness of this market 
power test in the New Zealand electricity market. Different from other electricity 
markets, in New Zealand hydro generation accounts for a large proportion in 
the total electricity production. With abundant amount of water resources, large 
water storage capacity, strict rules on the carbon emission and capacity 
constraint on the gas generation plant, it is likely that gas generation will not 
always run as the marginal generator therefore as a result these properties could 
potentially affect the effectiveness of this market power test. If this test fails to 
distinguish between the prices and quantities generated under perfect 
competition and under monopoly, then we can conclude that this widely 
adopted approach is not suitable for assessing the exercise of market power in 
the New Zealand electricity market. 
 
Theoretically, there is another approach that can be used to test the existence of 
market power in a market where the hydro generation serves as the marginal 
generator. This simplified version of market power test described in BBW can be 
modified in the way that instead of subtracting off the hydro generation, 
subtract the gas generation. One can simulate the marginal cost curve of hydro 
generation, then compare the marginal cost of generation at the market clearing 
quantity for hydro generation with the market clearing price. However, this 
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approach is not implementable as it is very difficult to estimate the marginal cost 
of water using publicly available data. This is because the choice of the optimal 
level of hydro generation depends on a number of factors, for example the lake 
level, inflow and future electricity prices etc and therefore the marginal cost 
curve of hydro generation cannot be simulated without knowledge on those 
factors. 
 
7.3 Results 
 
Using the market power test we described in section 7.2 on the data generated in 
the standard model we find that the market power test can successfully 
distinguish between a market with and without market power.  
First we run the market power test described in section 7.2  on the data 
generated in the standard competitive setting. Diagram 7-2 below shows the 
difference between the market clearing price of electricity and the per unit 
marginal cost of generating and transmitting gas generated electricity at the 
equilibrium quantity of gas generation. By comparing the price and the marginal 
cost we find that in the competitive setting, the sum of marginal generation cost 
and transmission cost of gas generated electricity is fully reflected by the market 
clearing price in the competitive market – that is, there is no difference between 
the price and the marginal cost of gas generated electricity over the 30 years 
range in the competitive market setting. These results suggest that the market 
power test we adopted here does not find existence of any abuse of market 
power in the data simulated in our standard competitive model, as expected. 
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Diagram 7-2: Difference between the price and the marginal cost of gas 
generation (                  ) in the standard competitive market. 
 
Applying the same market power test method on the data generated in the 
standard pure monopoly setting, we find strong evidence of the existence of 
market power abuse in this market. Diagram 7-3 presents the difference between 
the market clearing price and the marginal cost of gas generation (which 
includes both the marginal generation cost and the transmission cost) at the 
equilibrium quantity of gas generation on a daily basis over 30 years time. We 
observe that the price is consistently higher than the marginal cost of gas 
generation. The mark-up (price minus the marginal cost) is especially higher in 
periods when the inflow is low.  
 
Diagram 7-3: Difference between the price and the marginal cost of gas 
generation (                  ) in the standard monopoly market. 
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The market power test helps us to clearly distinguish the market with and 
without the abuse of market power – we observe no difference between the price 
and the marginal cost of gas generated electricity at the equilibrium quantity in 
the competitive market, and a significant difference in the market with the 
monopoly power. This test method also works on a number of other settings 
with changes in some of the input parameters, for example the ones we have 
seen in the previous section. 
 
In most of the cases we observe that the market clearing price equals the 
marginal cost of gas generated electricity in the data generated in the 
competitive setting and the price exceeds the marginal cost of gas generated 
electricity in the data generated in the monopoly market. 
 
However, we do find that this method fails to distinguish the data generated in a 
competitive market and in a monopoly market in certain cases which includes 
the cases when only 40 percent of the gas generation capacity in the standard 
setting is available and when the marginal cost of gas generation is 60 percent 
lower than the standard setting.  
 
In both cases we observe that the price exceeds the marginal cost of gas 
generated electricity not only in the data generated in the monopoly market but 
also in the data generated in the competitive market as presented in diagrams 7-
4 and 7-5. Though by comparing the difference between price and marginal cost 
we can tell that the data generated in the competitive setting has a significantly 
lesser extent of market power abuse than the data generated in the monopoly 
setting, as the price in the competitive market exceeds the marginal cost only in 
some periods but not all, and the difference is also much smaller than they are in 
the monopoly market setting. However, the test cannot give us any clear 
indication on in which market the existence of market power abuse is in absent; 
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instead it reports the existence of market power abuse even when it is applied to 
data that is generated in a perfect competitive setting.  
 
 
Diagram 7-4: Difference between price and the marginal cost of gas generation 
(including the transmission cost) in a competitive market when the capacity of 
gas generation is small. 
 
 
Diagram 7-5: Difference between price and the marginal cost of gas generation 
(including the transmission cost) in a competitive market when the marginal cost 
of gas is low. 
 
The reason behind the failure of the market power test is that in both of these 
cases, the gas generation, in some periods, no longer serves as the marginal 
generator in the market. Instead in those periods it reaches its maximum 
generation capacity allowing the price to exceed the marginal cost. In the case 
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with small maximum generation capacity, the full capacity is so small that it is 
easily reached in periods when the inflows are low; and in the case with low 
marginal cost coefficient, the cost of gas generation is low so in some periods the 
social planner, especially when the shadow price of water is high, is happy to 
use as much of the gas capacity as it can due to its low operational marginal cost. 
In these periods where the gas generation reaches its maximum capacity, the 
marginal cost of gas generation at the equilibrium quantity of gas generated 
electricity (which equals to its maximum capacity) fails to represent the overall 
marginal cost of generation at the market clearing quantity. The overall marginal 
cost equals the cost of producing the last unit of electricity, which is generated 
using hydro. Using the marginal cost of gas generation as an estimate of the 
overall marginal cost would cause a downwards bias. As a result the positive 
difference between the market clearing price and the marginal cost of gas 
generation may not be evidence of the existence of market power; it is likely that 
a positive difference will be observed in some periods even when the data come 
from a perfectly competitive market. 
 
In the actual New Zealand market, some other non-hydro generation in New 
Zealand also faces reservoir constraints due to the inefficiency in the speed of 
delivery of the reserves of fuel29. Accordingly, much of the analysis of hydro 
generation in this thesis can be applied to non-hydro generation in New Zealand. 
                                                 
29
 A good example of this is thermal generation. 
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Section 8  Conclusion 
 
This paper introduces a tractable approach to model a hydro dominated 
electricity market.  This model properly accounts for the key characteristics of 
such markets, that fuel availability is stochastic and that there exists the 
possibility of managing this volatility by means of storage. The model permits 
study of cases where there is a mix of generators with different fuels. It enables 
us to compute the equilibrium outcomes and the endogenous hidden marginal 
cost of water, or in other words the forward-looking shadow price of water, 
under different market structures.  The model is calibrated to the New Zealand 
electricity market, taking into account the property of hydro dominance, volatile 
inflow and low capacity of lake storage. 
 
We find that with the ability to store the fuel the price and quantity in the 
market are volatile, but less volatile than the fuel availability. A competitive 
market produces higher welfare than the monopolist in each period, supplying a 
large quantity at lower prices. However, the monopolist uses significantly less 
gas than the social planner. Overall the monopolist has less volatile market 
outcomes. The model suggests that an increase in the mean of the hydro fuel 
availability lead to a significant increase in welfare.  On the other hand a 
decrease in the ability to forecast inflows, resulting from less rapid mean 
reversion, reduces the average welfare. 
 
Our paper also shows that the presence of real options embedded in the stored 
fuel make it difficult to detect abuses of market power in practice under certain 
circumstances - the price exceeds the operational marginal cost in a market that 
is perfectly competitive when the gas generation reaches its maximum capacity. 
This can happen when the marginal cost of gas is low and/or when the capacity 
of the gas plant is small enough. This suggests that the positive difference 
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between the market clearing price and the marginal cost of gas generation 
estimated in a static setting may not be evidence of the existence of market 
power. 
 
The approach is tractable enough such that it can be modified to fit other market 
structures, for example the oligopoly structure. The model can also be calibrated 
for other markets other than the New Zealand Electricity to model their markets.  
 
An important extension would be to incorporate stochastic demand. This source 
of volatility and uncertainty is characteristic of electricity markets, and would 
likely affect the use of storage and the value attached to storage facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
119 
 
Reference 
 
Bellman,R.E. 1957. Dynamic Programming. Princeton, NJ. 
 
Borenstein, S., 2002, The trouble with electricity markets: understanding 
California's restructuring disaster, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 
191-211. 
 
Borenstein, Severen and James Bushnell, 1999, An Empirical Analysis of 
the Potential for Market Power in California’s Electricity Industry, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 47(3),285-323. 
 
Borenstein, Severin, James B. Bushnell, and Frank A. Wolak. 2002. Measuring 
market inefficiencies in California’s restructured wholesale electricity 
market. American Economic Review 92:1376–1405. 
 
Borenstein, S. and Bushnell, J. and Knittel, C.,1999, power in electricity markets: 
Beyond concentration measures, ENERGY JOURNAL-CAMBRIDGE, 20, 65-88. 
 
Evans, Lewis, and Graeme Guthrie, 2009. ‚How Options Provided by Storage 
Affect Electricity Prices‛, Southern Economic Journal, 75(3), 681-702. 
 
Evans, Lewis, and Richard Meade, 2005. Alternating Currents or Counter-
Revolution?. Victoria University Press. pp. 138. 
 
Green, Richard, and David Newbery. 1992. Competition in the British electricity 
spot market. Journal of Political Economy 100:929–53. 
 
Hildebrandt, Eric. ,2001, Further Analysis of the Exercise and Cost Impacts of 
Market Power in California’s Wholesale Electricity Market, Report from the 
California Independent System Operator’s Department of Market Analysis. 
 
Hogan, Read and Ring. 1996. Using mathematical programming for electricity 
spot pricing. International Transactions in Operational Research, 3, 209-221. 
 
Hortacsu, A and S.L Pullar (2008), 2005, Testing Models of Strategic Bidding in 
Auction: A Case Study of the Texas Electricity Spot Market. NBER Working 
Paper 11123.  
 
Hortacsu, A and S.L Pullar (2008), Understanding stregic bidding in multiunit 
auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market, The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 39, 86-114. 
 
120 
 
Joskow, Paul L., and Edward Kahn. 2002. A quantitative analysis of pricing 
behavior in California’s wholesale electricity market during summer 2000. 
Energy Journal 23:1–35. 
 
Lyle, M. R. and R.J. Elliott 2009, A simple hybrid model for power derivatives, 
Energy Economics, 31, 757-767. 
 
Rosse, J. N. 1970. Estimating Cost Function Parameters Without Using Cost 
Data., Econometrica 38:256-74. 
 
Scott, T.J. and E.G. Read, 1996, Modelling Hydro Reservoir Operation in 
a Deregulated Electricity Market, Int. Trans. Opl Res, 3(3/4), 243-253. 
 
Wolak, Frank A. 2001. Identification and estimation of cost functions using 
observed bid data: An application to electricity markets. NBER Working 
Paper 8191. 
 
Wolak, Frank A. 2003. Measuring unilateral market power in wholesale 
electricity markets: The California market, 1998–2000. American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred and Fiftieth Annual 
Meeting 93: 425–430. 
 
Wolak, F.A. and Nordhaus, R. and Shapiro, C., 2000, An Analysis of the June 
2000 Price Spikes in the California ISO’s Energy and Ancillary Services Markets, 
California ISO Market Surveillance Committee, Sep. 
 
Wolfram, Catherine D. 1998. Strategic bidding in a multiunit auction: An 
empirical analysis of bids to supply electricity in England andWales. RAND 
Journal of Economics 29:703–725. 
 
Wolfram, Catherine D. 1999. Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity 
spot market. American Economic Review, 89:805–826. 
27 
121 
 
Appendix 1:  Derivation of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 
 
In section 1.1 we see that in a competitive market, given the value for s and y, 
producer’s objective is to choose the amount of hydro generation z and the 
amount of gas generation m at time t to maximize the expected present value of 
life time total surplus W, 
 
            
   
 
 
                                             
 
We can re-write this presentation of expected present value of life time total 
surplus as the summation of two parts: total surplus from the first period, and 
value of W one period later               discounted back one period, 
 
         
               
                        
                                  
                                        
 
The W on the left hand side of this equation cancel out with the W on the right 
hand side, therefore we are left with the following equation: 
 
                                       
 
Given that                       and               , we can present the 
expected present value of lifetime surplus at one period later in the following 
way, 
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Substitute the value of )(dWE into the equation we obtained by re-writing W, we 
get: 
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Given that 02 dt , by rearranging the equation above and dividing both side by 
  , we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation for the producer’s 
optimization problem, that is, 
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Appendix 2: Initial guess for the generation policy 
 
The initial guess for the hydro generation policy has to be chosen specifically to 
ensure that the corresponding storage policy is feasible. 
 
The generation policy that the social planner adopts together with the water 
inflow from the river in that period automatically determines the optimal 
storage policy. Specifically, for a particular level of inflow, the hydro generation 
policy will tell us how much water would be used to generate electricity. If the 
inflow is greater than the hydro generation (     ), then the social planner will 
put the unused water into the storage, the lake level will rise by       ; whereas 
if the hydro generation    given by the generation policy is higher than the 
inflow    , then social planner will take       amount of water out of storage to 
be used to generate electricity. 
 
In order to maximize the objective, it’s more likely for the social planner to use 
less hydro to generate electricity if the shadow price of water (  ) is high. A 
High shadow price of water occurs when there’s little water in the storage lake.  
Using less water in generation while having a big inflow will leave more to be 
stored in the lake. That is, when the storage level is low and the inflow is high, a 
reasonable hydro generation policy should choose to use low hydro in 
generation and to store more water. On the other hand, when there is plenty of 
water in the storage lake already and/or there’s a small inflow from the river, the 
generation policy should tell the social planner to use a lot of water in electricity 
generation which makes it more likely to lower the lake.  
 
This suggests that the initial guess of hydro generation policy should be a 
function of the inflow level and of the storage level and should have the 
following property：The level of change in storage (     ) following the initial 
generation policy should have positive sign when the storage is low and when 
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the inflow is high; and it should have negative sign when the storage is high and 
when the inflow is low. 
 
 
 
 
A simple policy that embodies the property we need is described as using our 
defined orderings of variables. 
 
 
 
 
S1 
Sn+1 
Y1-dy 
(Yn+1)+dy 
  yt – zt>0 
yt – zt <0 
High inflow 
High Storage 
Low Inflow 
Low Storage 
yt-zt >0 
yt – zt<0 
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Along the straight-line                             water coming from the 
inflow will be stored. For the combination of S and y in the grid that’s on the left 
hand of the line, less water than the inflow will be used and some will be stored. 
However, for the combination of s and y in the grid that’s on the right hand side 
of the line, the social planner will choose to use more hydro than the inflow 
which involves lowering the lake.  
 
Presume that the function that represents the initial hydro generation policy is in 
the form of                , we need to find out the expression for 
          that gives the properties stated above. 
 
 
 
Since line from B to C that represents       is a straight line, taking an arbitrary 
point A on this line, the slope of the line BA should be the same as the slope of 
line BC. Given this, the following equation has to hold: 
 
           
      
 
                 
         
 
 
The expression for s that satisfies the above condition: 
  
                                                 
             
 
A 
B 
C 
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Knowing                 and when      the level of storage s has to 
equal to the function above, the following equation has to hold: 
 
        
      
             
 
      
             
  
         
             
 
         
             
 
           
             
 
           
             
 
 
Given that along the line BC there’s no change in the level of storage (     ),  
the coefficient of    has to equal to 1, and the intercept term has to equal to 0. 
 
   
      
             
 
      
             
   
 
  
         
             
 
         
             
 
           
             
 
           
             
   
 
Solving the two equations above simultaneously, we obtain expressions for a 
and c as a function of b: 
 
  
                           
             
    
 
  
                                            
             
 
 
Given a particular value of b, as long as a and c follow the expression described 
above, this will make sure the plane that represents the initial hydro generation 
policy in 3D space of (s, y, z) will go though the z=y line.   
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However, we still have another constraint on the choice of hydro generation, 
that is the hydro generation has to be non-negative ( 0z ). We need to choose a 
particular level of b that satisfies this condition. One way of doing this is to make 
an arbitrary assumption that on the left hand boundary of the grid (that is when 
the storage is at its lowest level) the amount of hydro generation equals to half of 
the water inflow. In other words, we assume that when the storage is empty, we 
use only half of the water inflow and store the other half. Because the inflow is 
always non-negative, this guarantees that no matter how high the shadow price 
of water is hydro generation will never fall below zero. 
 
Given the imposed condition that when minss  , yz
2
1
 , the following equation 
has to hold: 
 
  
 
 
 
                                            
             
       
 
                           
             
   
 
To simplify our calculation, if we set minydy  , the equation above can be 
simplified into: 
 
 
 
                       
       
 
 
We can solve for the expression: 
  
       
            
 
 
Therefore our initial guess for the hydro generation policy takes the following 
form: 
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Where  
 
 
 
               
            
 
               
            
 
                 
            
 
                 
            
             
 
 
  
       
            
 
 
  
         
             
            
 
             
            
     
             
 
 
For example, when        ,            ,        ,        ,         and 
       , using the formulas stated above we get a=0, b=1.025 and c=0.5. 
Consequently, the initial guess for the hydro generation policy is: 
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Appendix 3: Evaluating Shadow prices of water Ws for points on the Right 
and Left boundaries 
 
 
In this section we show the derivation of the formula we use to evaluate the 
shadow price Ws for the case when s is at its lowest level (left-hand-side 
boundary points) and when s is at its highest level (right-hand-side boundary 
points). 
 
Left Boundary 
 
For the points on the left-hand-side boundary ( minss  ), since no smaller values 
of s is available, we need to derive a formula for Ws that only involves using 
values of the function at those points that’s greater or equal to mins . 
 
We can approximate a function near a certain point if we know its value at that 
point and the values of its derivatives there. The expansion is called a Taylor 
Series Expansion of the function about that point x , which gives 
22 )(
2
1
)()()(
2
1
)()()( dxxfdxxfxfdxxfdxxfxfdxxf  
, 
and equivalently,
 
2)(2)(4)(4)(4 dxxfdxxfxfdxxf  . 
 
Using the same method we can get an approximation for )2( dxxf  : 
2)(2)(2)()2( dxxfdxxfxfdxxf   
Eliminating the second order differential term 2)( dxxf  , we get: 
 
dxxfxfdxxfdxxf )(2)(3)2()(4   
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Rearrange to solve for )(xf  : 
 
dx
xfdxxfdxxf
xf
2
)(3)2()(4
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Therefore when         
 
          
                                   
   
 
 
 
Right Boundary 
 
For the points on the right side boundary ( maxss  ), since there are no higher 
values of s available we need to derive a formula for Ws that only involves using 
values of function at points less or equal to maxs . 
 
Using a Taylor Series Expansion we get 
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2
1
)()()( dxxfdxxfxfdxxf   
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And 
 
2)(2)(2)()2( dxxfdxxfxfdxxf   
 
To eliminate the second order differential term 2)( dxxf  , we have 
 
131 
 
dxxfxfdxxfdxxf )(2)(3)2()(4   
 
Rearrange to solve for )(xf   as a function of )(xf , )( dxxf  and )2( dxxf   
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Therefore when         , 
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Appendix 4: Estimating the parameters for water inflow that follows a square-
root process30 
 
It is assumed that the water inflow     evolves according to the square-root 
process, which is presented in the following form: 
 
                      
 
where            are constant, and      is independently and normally 
distributed with mean of zero and variance of one. 
 
This square-root process is one type of mean-reverting diffusion process that 
yields only nonnegative values. According to this process, water inflow    has an 
unconditional mean of   and variance of  
 
  
  . The term   measures the rate of 
mean-reversion which is the rate at which this process is pulled back towards 
the mean parameter   . 
 
Suppose that       is a smooth function of     , using Taylor Expansion we can 
write the process for       as 
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df ,                                  [4.1] 
 
where the dots denote a remainder which is small enough to be ignored. 
 
If           , the terms in equation [4.1] can be computed as follows: 
 
                                                 
30
 The approach described here is used in  Guthrie and Evans 2007 (electricity) 
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Given that 02 dt ,          and    
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Substitute these terms into equation [4.1],  
       
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
       
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
      
 
 
    
 
We re-write this continuous process with discrete time step length of t , 
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Equation [2] can be re-arranged into, 
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We regress y mean of ordinary least square (OLS) 1ty  on the variables of 
1
ty  and ty  to obtain estimates for coefficients 1ˆ , 2ˆ  and the standard error 
of estimation ˆ . Therefore given that the OLS estimators are consistent, the 
parameter estimates for the square root process are as follows, 
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The data we use to estimate the parameters for the water inflow ( ty ) process is 
the monthly water inflow data available from the centralised dataset issued by 
the New Zealand Electricity Commission. These inflow data are measured in the 
unit of gigawatt hour (GWh), and they cover the period from July 1931 to June 
2006. 
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We first divide all the inflow data by 24727 to convert them into standard units 
(1 standard unit = 24727 gigawatt hours31), then annualize these monthly inflow 
data by multiplying them by 12. We take the square root value of these 
annualized data and regress them on their first lag and their first lag inverse to 
obtain estimated parameters of 1ˆ , 2ˆ  and ˆ . Using these estimates we can 
compute the parameters of the square root process for water inflow ty , 
 
  tttt dydtydy 9056.019448.6   
 
 
  
                                                 
31
 Details see section : New Zealand Calibration. 
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Appendix 5:  Static optimization results for the competition model 
 
 
Diagram A5-1: Hydro generation z* for the social planner when the lake is 
empty 
 
 
Diagram A5-1 shows the optimal hydro generation policy for a social planner 
when the lake is empty.  Given inflow y , when the shadow price of water is 
zero, the social planner chooses to use as much of the inflow for electricity 
generation as possible, subject to the hydro electricity generation capacity 
constraint. Any excess water is stored. However, as the shadow price of water 
gets higher, the optimal level of hydro generation will gradually decrease until it 
reaches zero. This is because when the shadow price gets higher, the benefit of 
storing the water in the lake now for later use becomes greater than the benefit 
we get from using it to generate electricity at the present date. As a result when 
sW  gets higher it is more likely that the social planner will store more water. 
When the shadow price is greater than 2 (the 10th value for sW  in our grid)
32, the 
social planner will put all of the inflow into storage. The critical value of the 
shadow price sW  above which the social planner starts to put water into storage 
depends on the amount of inflow from the river y . When the inflow is high, the 
                                                 
32
 About the set-up of the grid, see Appendix 2 
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social planner will start to put water into the lake at a low level of sW ; whereas 
when the inflow is low, sW  has to be sufficiently high for storage to occur. The 
peak electricity price is more likely to occur in this scenario because the scarcity 
of water (no water in storage) will be associated with a high shadow price of 
water. 
 
               
 
 
Diagram A5-2: Hydro generation z* for the social planner when the Lake is full 
 
 
Diagram A5-2 shows the optimal hydro generation policy when the lake is full. 
Since the storage option is no longer available, any inflow from the river must 
either be used in generation or spilled. Stored water is costly only when hydro 
generation exceeds the amount of inflow. When the inflow is high, it is optimal 
for the social planner to run hydro electricity generation at maximum generation 
capacity and spill the remaining inflow. This is because in such cases the water 
resource is so abundant that the unconstrained optimal hydro generation 
exceeds the capacity constraint. On the other hand when the water inflow is low, 
the optimal amount of hydro generation depends on the shadow price of water. 
When the shadow price of water is high, it is too costly to use water in the 
storage lake to generate; therefore it is optimal for the social planner to set the 
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amount of hydro generation equal to the water inflow in that period. However, 
when the shadow price is low, it becomes optimal for the social planner to lower 
the storage lake by allocating stored water to hydro generation. 
 
Diagram A4-3:  Gas generation m* for the social planner given that the lake is 
empty 
 
 
Diagram A4-3 shows the optimal gas generation policy of the social planner 
when the lake is empty. When the shadow price of water equals zero, at inflow 
levels that are above the amount of water needed for reaching the maximum 
generation capacity of the hydro plant the social planner chooses to run hydro 
generation at its full generation capacity which equals 1.901 units and sets the 
gas generation at its corresponding optimal level which equals 0.242896 units. 
This positive quantity of gas generation at zero shadow price of water comes 
from the assumption that gas-generated electricity has a lower transmission cost 
relative to hydro-generated electricity33 and it has a linear marginal cost function 
starting from zero34.  As a result no matter what value the shadow price of water 
is, the first 0.242896 units of electricity on the electricity supply curve will always 
be generated using gas plant. On the other hand, when the shadow price equals 
                                                 
33
 Transmission cost for hydro generated electricity is at 0.19363 per unit, whereas the transmission cost 
for gas generated electricity is at 0.10106 per unit. For details, see section xxx. 
34
 The gas plant has a total cost function of              , and a marginal cost function of      
       .  
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zero, for the inflow level that is below 1.901 the social planner uses all of the 
inflow in hydro generation. Being a substitute for hydro generation, gas 
generation will be at the level which maximizes the net social benefit given that 
all the inflow is used in hydro generation. This optimal gas generation quantity 
decreases as inflow increases. At a given level of inflow y , as the shadow price 
of water sW  increases gas generation is increasingly preferred to hydro 
generation as in that case it is cheaper to use gas than water and gas generation 
is substituted for hydro. That is why Diagram 5-4 shows that as sW  increases the 
amount of gas generation increases until it reaches its interior optimal 
generation level given that gas is the sole source of electricity generation 
( 29143.1m ). These observations show that if the shadow price of water is high 
enough, gas is capable of being the sole generation on the market; whereas 
hydro will never be the sole generation as at least 0.242896 units of gas 
generation will always take place due to its low transmission cost. 
 
 
 
 
Diagram A5-4: Gas generation m* for the social planner when the Lake is full 
 
Diagram A5-4 shows the optimal gas generation policy of a social planner when 
the lake is full. When inflow is high (inflow is higher than 2, or the 10th value for 
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y), the water resource is so abundant that the social planner will meet the 
demand by running hydro plant at its full capacity and use gas plant to generate 
0.242896 units of electricity. The same happens when the shadow price of water 
equals zero while the water inflow is low, as in such case the water is very cheap 
so that it is optimal for the social planner to substitute as much hydro generation 
as possible for gas.  However, given that the inflow is low, when the opportunity 
cost of water sW  is higher, the producer will start to use gas generation. At a 
given level of sW , generally a decrease in inflow y will lead to an increase in the 
level of gas generation until it reaches its unconstrained optimal generation level 
(which is lower than the maximum generation capacity of the gas plant, 
( mm  33454.11.29143* ). 
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Appendix 6: Static optimization result for the monopoly model 
 
In a static setting, a monopolist electricity generator chooses the amount of 
hydro and gas generation to maximize its profit while the water inflow and the 
shadow price of water are taken as given.  The objective function for the 
electricity generator in a monopoly market is given below, 
 
   
     
                     
  
  
                 
 
The monopoly generator’s optimal generation policies in this static setting will 
be summarized by six diagrams, which cover the optimal generation policy for 
both hydro and gas generation while the lake is empty, full or somewhere in 
between. 
 
(1) Optimal hydro generation when the lake is empty ( 0|* tSz ); 
(2) Optimal hydro generation when the lake has spare capacity 
( SSz t 0|* ); 
(3) Optimal hydro generation when the lake is full ( SSz t |* ); 
(4) Optimal gas generation when the lake is empty ( 0|* tSm ); 
(5) Optimal gas generation when the lake has spare capacity ( SSm t 0|* ); 
   and 
(6) Optimal gas generation when the lake is full ( SSm t |* ). 
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Diagram A6-1: Hydro generation *z  for a monopoly generator when the 
lake is empty 
 
 
Diagram A6-1 shows the optimal hydro generation policy for a monopolist 
generator when the lake is empty.  The hydro generation capacity constraint is 
never binding here, because the generator’s optimal level hydro generation at 
any given combination of shadow price of water and inflow is always less than 
the maximum generation capacity. For a monopolist generator, if there is no 
constraint on the availability of water resources, his optimal level of hydro 
generation is 1.07645. Given inflow y , when the shadow price of water is zero, 
the monopolist generator chooses to generate the optimal level of hydro 
generation of 1.07645 as long as there is enough inflow from the river and store 
the excess water.  If the inflow in that period is less than 1.07645, the generator 
uses all inflow in hydro generation without storing any.  However, as the 
shadow price of water gets higher, the optimal level of hydro generation will 
gradually decrease until it reaches zero. As shadow price gets higher, the benefit 
of storing the water in the lake for later use becomes greater than the benefit we 
get from using it to generate electricity at the present date. As a result when Ws  
is higher it is more likely that the monopolist generator will store more water. 
When the shadow price is greater than 1.2 (the 7th value for Ws ) 35 , the 
                                                 
35
 This is equivalent to xxx per MWh. 
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monopolist generator will put all of the inflow into storage. The critical value of 
the shadow price Ws  above which the monopolist generator starts to put water 
into storage depends on the amount of inflow from the river y . When the inflow 
is greater than the un-constrained optimal level of hydro generation, the 
monopoly generator will put water into the lake at any given value of Ws
(including when 0Ws ); whereas when the inflow is less than 1.07645, Ws  has 
to be sufficiently high for storage to occur and the smaller the inflow the larger 
the critical Ws  required for adding water into storage to take place. The peak 
electricity price is more likely to occur in this scenario because of the scarcity of 
water (no water in storage). 
 
 
 
Diagram A6-2: Hydro generation *z  for a monopoly generator when the 
lake is partially full 
 
 
Diagram A6-2 shows the optimal hydro generation policy for a monopolist 
generator when there is spare storage capacity in the lake, that is when the lake 
is neither empty nor full. At a point in time, there is water inflow from the river 
and stored water in the lake, thus no upper bound is imposed on hydro 
generation apart from the capacity of the plant. As a result, the optimal hydro 
generation policy only depends on the shadow price of water Ws : it is not a 
function of the inflow level. When the shadow price of water Ws  is very low at a 
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value that is close to zero, we observe that the monopoly generator chooses the 
amount of hydro generation equal to its un-constrained optimal level which is 
1.07645. As Ws  moves away from zero to higher values, the opportunity cost of 
using hydro resource in electricity generation increases, and it is optimal for the 
generator to decrease the level of hydro generation (z*). This decline in z* will 
continue as Ws  increases until hydro generation reaches zero (when Ws  takes 
value beyond 1.2, the 7th value of Ws  in our grid).  
 
 
 
Diagram A6-3: Hydro generation *z  for a monopoly generator when the 
lake is full 
 
 
Diagram A6-3 shows the optimal hydro-generation policy for a monopolist 
generator when the lake is full. Since the storage option is no longer available, 
any inflow from the river must either be used in generation or spilled. Using 
water is costly only when hydro generation exceeds the amount of inflow. When 
the inflow is higher than 1.07645, it is optimal for the generators to run hydro 
electricity generation at the un-constrained optimal generation level 
( 07645.1*z , which is lower than its maximum generation capacity) and spill 
the remaining inflow. On the other hand when the water inflow is less than 
1.07645, the optimal amount of hydro generation depends on the shadow price 
of water. When the shadow price of water is high, it is too costly to use water in 
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the lake to generate; therefore it is optimal for the generator to set the amount of 
hydro generation equal to the water inflow in that period. However, when the 
shadow price is low, it becomes optimal for the generators to lower the lake by 
allocating stored water to hydro generation. 
 
 
Diagram A6-4: Gas generation *m  for a monopoly generator when the lake is 
empty 
 
Diagram A6-4 shows the optimal gas generation policy for a monopoly 
generator when the lake is empty. When the shadow price of water is equal to 
zero, at inflow levels that are above 1.07645 the generator chooses to generate 
hydro generation at its unconstrained optimal level and sets the gas generation 
equal to 0.0669994 units. This positive quantity comes from the assumption that 
gas generated electricity has a lower transmission cost relative to hydro 
generated electricity and a linear marginal cost function that starts from zero. As 
a result no matter what value the shadow price of water is, the first 0.0669994 
units of electricity in this market will always be generated using gas plant.  
Whereas for the inflow levels that are below 1.0821 the generator uses all of the 
inflow in hydro generation. Being a substitute for hydro generation, gas 
generation will be at the level which maximizes the profit for the generator 
given that all the inflow is used in hydro generation. This optimal generation 
quantity decreases as inflow (which equals to the amount of hydro generation) 
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increases. At a given level of inflow y , as the shadow price of water Ws  
increases gas generation is increasingly preferred to hydro generation as in that 
case it is relatively cheaper to use gas than water and gas generation is 
substituted for hydro. That is why Diagram 5-24 has asWs  increasing the 
amount of gas generation increases until it reaches its unconstrained optimal 
generation level ( 832338.0*m ) which is lower than the maximum generation 
capacity of the gas plant ( 133454.m ).  
 
 
 
Diagram A6-5: Gas generation *m  for the monopoly generator when the lake 
is partially full 
 
Diagram A6-5 shows the optimal gas generation policy for the monopolist 
generator when the lake is neither empty nor full.  At a point in time, the 
optimal electricity generation policy only depends on the shadow price of water 
Ws : it is not a function of the inflow level. When the value of stored water Ws  
equals zero, the monopolist generator chooses to generate 0.0669994 units of 
electricity using the gas plant. That is the optimal level of gas generation given 
that the hydro plant is generating at its unconstrained optimal level (given that 
the shadow price of water equals zero). As the shadow price of water increases 
from zero the monopolist generator will choose to substitute more gas for hydro, 
until the unconstrained optimal level of gas generation, which is equal to 
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0.832338 units, is reached. The minimum value of the shadow price Ws  in which 
the gas becomes the sole source of electricity generation is 1.2 (which is the 7th 
value of Ws in our grid). 
 
 
 
 
Diagram A6-6: Gas generation *m  for a monopolist generator when the lake is 
full 
 
 
Diagram A6-6 shows the optimal gas generation policy when the lake is full. 
When inflow is high (inflow is higher than 1.07645, which is slightly below the 
7th value for y in Diagram 5-26), the water resource is so abundant that the 
generator will set hydro generation at its unconstrained optimal level 
( 07645.1*z ) and therefore choosing the gas at its corresponding optimal level 
of 0.0669994 units. The same happens when the shadow price of water equals 
zero while the water inflow is less than 1.07645, as in this case the stored water is 
worth nothing so that it is optimal for the generator to set the hydro generation 
at its unconstrained optimal level and generate only a small quantity of 
electricity using gas generation.  However, given that the inflow is low and the 
opportunity cost of water sW  is greater than zero, the producer will start to use 
more gas generation. At a given level of sW , generally a decrease in inflow y  
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will lead to an increase in the level of gas generation until it reaches its 
unconstrained optimal generation level at 0.832338 units. 
 
